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15. The French Army.
Of France I will say little. The views which I have held for many years past on France’s rôle in the future war coincide almost completely with those contained in Colonel Grouard’s well-known book (“France et Allemagne—La Guerre eventuelle”). For instance, I never could understand why France built so many fortresses on the frontier; I was of opinion that France should not begin with an offensive, and I was afraid that she was not adequately prepared, whether from the military or the administrative point of view—this and other views I have expressed often before the war, and in a series of articles at the outbreak of the war. In these views I was confirmed by Colonel Grouard; I select his book out of the interesting French military literature, because it is well worth reading even to-day.
To me it was a problem why France, having had the experience of 1870–71 and dreaming of revenge, was not better prepared for the war, though, of course, I could observe that official France during the last few decades had given up the idea of such a revenge and of war in general. As a matter of fact the French Government was taken unprepared, just as England and all the other Allies.
All the more credit is due to France that, though at first she had a smaller army than the Germans, she could put up such resistance and could even gain the battle of the Marne—with the help of British troops. Now she has brought together a very big army, and the spirit of this army is excellent, as is shown by all the reports from the battlefield. I myself was pleasantly surprised during my stay in France by the sober, determined, and unpretentious behaviour of the French officers. The observer is struck by the apparent intelligence of both officers and soldiers. I must say that my French experiences were the most comforting which I have had during the later period of the war. I cannot refrain from praising the determined spirit which pervades the whole French nation. If there was in the first period of the war some indecision even in the Army, there is no longer any trace of it now. The French are more and more conscious of the great importance of the war and of its noble aims. M. Briand’s latest utterance is an expression of the general feeling and conviction in France.
16. Prussian Militarism and the Allies.
I am not surprised that France and Britain awoke comparatively late to the full consciousness of what this awful war means. France and Britain are parliamentary States. Democracy, though imperfect, is deeply rooted: the struggle for individual freedom is a national ideal: France is a republic. In order that Democracy and liberty should be strengthened, the spirit of aristocratism which has hitherto stood for militarism had to be weakened. Hence France and Britain, aiming at Democracy, naturally had to suppress or at least mitigate the military spirit. The course which this historical process is taking cannot be discussed here; but it is of great importance to be aware of the fact, to be able to understand the difference between military Germany and democratic France and Britain. I am inclined to believe that all the military and administrative drawbacks and shortcomings of France and Britain are precious proofs of the necessary weakening of militarism. I do not, of course, suggest that all these deficiencies are to be accounted for by real democratism, but a good many of them undoubtedly are.
What holds good of France and England can be to some extent applied to Russia as well, and also to Italy.
But the Allies decided to protect themselves and the small nations; they decided to crush Prussian militarism, and to free Europe from its weight. Militarism no doubt can be weakened
