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But the most striking explanation of the Mesopotamian failure was given by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords (December 7th). Lord Crewe made two statements: first, that General Townshend had a larger army than his own division; and, secondly, that he had not engaged in the battle on his own personal decision; on the contrary, the competent authorities considered his army sufficient in numbers for the purpose. Lord Crewe explained, with great emphasis, that the advance on Baghdad was contemplated some months ago; that this advance had a political meaning, and that by universal competent military opinion General Townshend’s forces were considered to be sufficient. “The task, however,” he says, “proved to be a heavier one than was anticipated, owing to the greatly superior forces of the enemy and their powerful armament of artillery.”
Now I admit that a disaster of this kind may happen to any army, but not at such a time and under political and strategical circumstances of such a kind as to demand the utmost effort not only on the part of the staff, but of every single general and officer! A disaster at such a moment as this shows that there must be grave shortcomings in the leading and administration of the army.
The Gallipoli undertaking, the diplomatic and strategical failure to be prepared to help. Serbia in time, the fact that German East Africa is to-day still in the hands of the Germans—all these are further indications of the same fact.
The narrowness of the Dardanelles and of the Gallipoli Peninsula should have prevented an attack against Turkey from this side. Both the Straits and the Peninsula can be easily defended by a comparatively small army, without the attacking army being able to make any display of forces.
So far as Serbia is concerned, it was the positive duty of the Allies, and especially of Britain, to come to her aid. But in doing so they were also, it must be remembered, protecting themselves. Britain, being at war with Turkey, had to attack as effectively as possible that was and is necessary if only for the sake of British prestige in Asia and the Balkans. The attack on Gallipoli and the Dardanelles shows that the obligation of assuming the offensive was felt; but in my opinion the true offensive would have been against Baghdad, with a view to joining hands with the Russians further north, and so eventually threatening Constantinople. In that case the attack on the Dardanelles and Gallipoli would look differently
How the southern point of Gallipoli and Salonica are to be held can be answered only by strategists, who know the strength of the army at their disposal. The situation is worse now that Bulgarian territory can be used by Turks and Germans. The Turks, Bulgarians and Germans with the Austrians may have 400 + 300 + 200 = 900,000 men: Serbia at the best 160,000—how many have the Allies? Will British troops come via Italy to Albania? Will the Italians take their part and the Russians or the Roumanians? The German leaders will no doubt fortify the whole Greek frontier, if they decide to respect Greece and her peculiar neutrality; but it is probable that they will attack both Salonica and Gallipoli. And Egypt and Baghdad! The political and economic significance of Egypt for Britain has been duly discussed by Pangerman politicians and strategists, and it must be expected that the Germans will not suddenly forget it, now that they are at Constantinople. Again and again one demand must be made: more soldiers, swift decisions and rapid movements! The Germans will do all in their power to weaken Britain and to injure her prestige in the Orient, and I expect a fierce attack on the British troops in the West also.
