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by peaceful means, but its attack cannot be repulsed by these means; and it may be argued that the policy of France and Britain was not always consistently democratic, or framed so as to prevent this war and to force Germany morally to a peaceful policy too. Europe is in a state of transition, and that often means “halfness.” In any case, once the Allies decided to face Germany on the battlefield, it was necessary for them to know the Germans and their methods, to understand German militarism, and to face it by adequate measures. Once they decided to cast out the devil by Beelzebub, they had to play the devil with the Prussian devil. And the devil is black—you can fight him with pure white, but never with some shade of dingy grey or red, and least of all with a motley display of irridescent hues and colours . . .
It is only natural that there was a certain amount of practical anti-militarism in some of the armies. But after seventeen months of fighting, not only the Government and the general staff, but every single man must be determined to win the great fight. One can understand Hervé’s position before the war, but to-day Hervé himself has taken the only possible and right path-to resist and to win. Liberty and democracy can only be protected and strengthened by determination, heroism, devotion and sacrifice.
Democracy with its Parliamentarism means Parley, means Compromise and the Direct Control of the People, whereas in war, in military and strategic matters, there is no time and no place for any kind of democratic referendum. Time and swiftness of decision means victory.
17.—The Russian Army.
I happened to be in Berlin several times during the first four months of the war; I heard there many expressions of amazement at the surprising achievements of the Russians. As I have already pointed out, the Germans, partly influenced by the Austrians, underestimated the Russian troops. In point of fact they were much better prepared than the Austrians—they had an overwhelming artillery, the equipment was good, as I heard from many competent quarters in the Austrian army; and very much praised was the Russian sanitary department.
The invasion of Bukovina and Galicia, the repulse of Hindenburg before Warsaw, &c., were splendid achievements; the victory in Galicia seemed to secure the road for the advance against Berlin, the image of the crushing steam roller became a necessary ingredient and topic of the daily stock of war-illustrations and forecasts. It is only just to say that this premature and hasty idea did not come from Russia only.
The Press of the Allies wrote very uncritically of the greatness and of the masses of Russia, indulging in the false opinion that Russian resources of men are inexhaustible. But “men " and “soldiers” are not the same thing. Russia had not the necessary millions of rifles and uniforms, she had not the necessary ammunition, and her quite respectable store of guns was exhausted. And, of course, the very greatness of Russia is her chief strategical source of weakness—the lack of railways and roads.
The Russians, like the British, gathered their military experience from fighting non-European armies; after the war with Japan the whole army and navy were in a state of transformation. It does Russia credit that the expectations of her enemies were deceived. I do not underrate the defeat which followed; and I would not seek to minimise the great masses of captured men and officers; but I cannot abstain from praising the Russian soldier, whose enforced retreat did not bring demoralisation with it. After all, the present defeat is balanced by the previous victory, and a new era is opening for the Russian army.
