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tation agent then contacted Trip 14, which was at that time north of West Palm Beach, but, apparently failing completely to comprehend the significance of Captain Meyers' first message, only told Trip 14 that Trip 10 was on instruments and wanted Trip 14 to stand by until he was in the clear. In accordance with this request. Trip 14 did stand by for approximately 10 minutes until 8:45 A.M., when he sent the following message to West Palm Beach:
"14 IS GOING ON TO DB (Daytona Beach) ON TOP IF WE RUN INTO INSTRUMENT WEATHER WILL STAND BY 'TIL 10 IS CLEAR."
Captain O'Brien and Pilot Crabtree stated that they interpreted the message received from West Palm Beach as a request for them to remain in the clear, thus allowing Trip 10 sufficient time to clear the cloud mass and avoid the possibility of collision.[1] Since the message sent by West Palm Beach did not include any reference whatsoever to the "heavy turbulence" that Captain Meyers had reported, it is not surprising that this message was misinterpreted by Trip 14 in just this way. Trip 14 then proceeded north and encountered the line squall with its attendant severe turbulence.
After having sent the message to West Palm Beach, Captain Meyers of Trip 10 broke out into the clear and in an effort to get around the storm proceeded west across the State of Florida to a point approximately 10 miles west of Avon Park, a deviation of approximately 65 miles west of his normal course. Being unable to get around the storm, he returned to West Palm Beach, landing at 9:40 A.M. During this flight Captain Meyers apparently made no effort to get in contact with ground stations to give them further advice as to the violence of the storm which he had encountered.[2] Nor did he attempt to report his position, notwithstanding the wide deviation he had made from his normal course. On the other hand, West Palm Beach made no effort to get in touch with Captain Meyers in order to secure from him more details as to the storm conditions he had encountered even though the transportation agent there knew that Trip 14 was proceeding along the same route on which Captain Meyers had encountered the "heavy turbulence". Captain Meyers did not make a full report of his experience until after he had returned to West Palm Beach at 9:40 A.M. when he reported to Miami by telephone that he had "encountered heavy hail, heavy rain, and severe turbulence in the vicinity south of OR (Orlando)".
In addition to the above-described failure of coordination between Trips 10 and 14 and the ground station, another trip of Eastern was permitted to take off from Miami for Orlando notwithstanding the reported storm conditions. Captain Whipprecht of Eastern's Flight 10 was permitted to depart from Miami for Orlando at 9:00 A.M. despite Trip 10's 8:30 A.M. message that he had encountered heavy turbulence. Trip 10 radioed at 9:15 A.M. that the flight was returning to West Palm Beach. The only conclusion that could be reached from those two messages was that the captain of Trip 10 had encountered weather that he did
- ↑ At the time of this accident Airway Traffic Control had not been established in Florida and the area south and east of Alma, Georgia. An Airway Traffic Control Center is being established in Jacksonville, Florida, for this area, and will be in operation on or about December 15, 1941.
- ↑ Section 61.770 of the Civil Air Regulations provides as follows:
"61.770 Weather interruption. If any hazardous flight condition is encountered en route, the pilot shall broadcast information as to the course of action which he is taking and as to his reasons therefor."
