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displacing action of colder air from the north moving southward into warm unstable air. In such an extensive area of thunderstorm activity it is probable that thunderstorms of all intensities would be found scattered all through the general storm area.
A study of the weather data available to the Weather Bureau for its 5:30 A.M.–1:30 P.M. forecast and to Eastern's meteorologist for his 5:20 A.M. trip forecast indicates that they predicted weather conditions to be expected along the route with reasonable accuracy considering the present knowledge of thunderstorm forecasting. However, these weather forecasts were made more than two hours before the departure of Trip 14 and failed to predict the severity of the storms, especially the degree of turbulence that might be expected.
Both forecasts were available to Captain O'Brien before he left Miami, and the 5:35 A.M. weather sequence was attached to his clearance. There was nothing in the weather data to lead him to believe that any unusual weather conditions would be encountered along his route. However, when he left West Palm Beach at approximately 8:20 A.M., the 7:35 A.M. weather sequence report was attached to his intermediate clearance and before he actually entered the thunderstorm area the 8:35 A.M. weather sequence became available. These hourly teletype sequences gave all the necessary indications of the development of a frontal condition such as was actually encountered. By the time the 7:35 A.M. sequence report had been received, a definite trend toward the development of a cold front or line squall type of thunderstorm was indicated. The 8:35 A.M. weather sequence reports confirmed this.
Since the regular practice of the United States Weather Bureau does not provide for revised or intermediate forecasts, the airlines depends largely upon their own meteorological services for up-to-the-minute route and terminal forecasts. Therefore it is clearly the responsibility of the company dispatcher and meteorologist to keep in constant touch with developments in the weather and to advise pilots if forecasts upon which they are depending appear to be erroneous. The 7:35 A.M. sequence report should have created a reasonable doubt in the mind of Eastern's Miami meteorologist as to the adequacy of both the trip and Weather Bureau forecasts, but after receiving, and presumably studying that report he made no attempt to supplement his original forecast or to issue a special revised forecast. By the time the 8:35 A.M. weather sequence reports were available, the weather conditions were such that efforts should have been made through the issuance of a strongly worded forecast or otherwise to advise pilots proceeding into the storm area that they would encounter, not scattered thunderstorms, but a line squall thunderstorm condition.
The dispatch and communications organization and procedure of Eastern Air Lines were also carefully considered during the course of the investigation and the evidence disclosed in that portion of the investigation shows a lack of adequate coordination between ground and flight operations and among aircraft in flight. At 8:20 A.M. Captain O'Brien took off from West Palm Beach on a weather forecast which indicated that he was to encounter scattered thunderstorms rather than a line squall or cold front which current weather data then available showed was to be anticipated. About 8:30 A.M. Captain Meyers of Trip 10, which had preceded Trip 14 by about 30 minutes stated that he encountered this line squall and experienced violent turbulence. After having turned back out of the storm he was impelled by his experience to radio West Palm Beach stating that Trip 14 should be held on the ground at West Palm Beach because he was "running into instrument weather with heavy turbulence". The transportation agent at West Palm Beach acknowledged receipt of the message by informing Trip 10 that Trap 14 had already departed West Palm Beach. Trip 10 then sent to West Palm Beach a message asking that Trip 14 be told to "stay out until we are clear". The transpor-
