Scranton v. Wheeler/Opinion of the Court

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Scranton v. Wheeler
Opinion of the Court by by John Marshall Harlan
830317Scranton v. Wheeler — Opinion of the Courtby John Marshall Harlan
Court Documents
Case Syllabus
Opinion of the Court
Concurring Opinion
Brewer

United States Supreme Court

179 U.S. 141

Scranton  v.  Wheeler

 Argued: October 16, 1899. --- Decided: November 12, 1900


1. The government insists that ejectment is not the proper remedy for a riparian owner to secure the removal of a structure that interferes with access by him from his fast land to navigable water. A sufficient answer to this objection is that the state court recognized the present action as a proper one under the laws of Michigan for the relief sought by the plaintiff. We have therefore to consider only the controlling questions of a Federal nature presented by the record and decided by the state court.

2. The supreme court of the state correctly held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that a judgment against him would in legal effect be a judgment against the United States. It is true the defendant, Wheeler, insisted that the action of which the plaintiff complained was taken by him under the authority of the United States. But this fact was not sufficient to defeat the suit. If the plaintiff was entitled to access from his land to navigable water, and if the defendant stood in the way of his enjoying that right, then the court was under a duty to inquire whether the defendant had or could have any authority in law to do what he had done; and the suit was not to be deemed one against the United States because in the consideration of that question it would become necessary to ascertain whether the defendant could constitutionally acquire from the United States authority to obstruct the plaintiff's access to navigable water in front of his land without making or securing compensation to him. The issue, in point of law, was between the individual plaintiff and the individual defendant, and, the United States not being a party of record, a judgment against Wheeler will not prevent it from instituting a suit for the direct determination of its rights as against the plaintiff. This subject has been examined by the court in numerous cases, the most recent one being Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 222, 223, 42 L. ed. 137, 143, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. In that case-which was a suit to recover real property in South Carolina held by the defendants, as they insisted, in their capacities as officers of the state, and only for the state-it was said that 'the 11th Amendment gives no immunity to officers or agents of a state in withholding the property of a citizen without authority of law. And when such officers or agents assert that they are in rightful possession, they must make good that assertion when it is made to appear in a suit against them as individuals that the legal title and right of possession is in the plaintiff.' Again: 'It is said that the judgment in this case may conclude the state. Not so. It is a judgment to the effect only that, as between the plaintiff and the defendants, the former is entitled to possession of the property in question, the latter having shown no valid authority to withhold possession from the plaintiff; that the assertion by the defendants of a right to remain in possession is without legal foundation The state not being a party to the suit, the judgment will not conclude it. Not having submitted its rights to the determination of the court in this case, it will be open to the state to bring any action that may be appropriate to establish and protect whatever claim it has to the premises in dispute. Its claim, if it means to assert one, will thus be brought to the test of the law as administered by tribunals ordained to determine controverted rights of property; and the record in this case will not be evidence against it for any purpose touching the merits of its claim.'

These principles are applicable to the present case, and show that it is not within the rule forbidding a suit against the United States except with its consent.

3. The vital question, therefore, is the one heretofore mentioned, namely, whether the prohibition in the Constitution of the United States, of the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, has any application to the case of an owner of land bordering on a public navigable river whose access from his land to navigability is permanently lost by reason of the construction of a pier resting on submerged lands away from, but in front of, his upland, and which pier was erected by the United States, not with any intent to impair the rights of riparian owners, but for the purpose only of improving the navigation of such river.

Undoubtedly compensation must be made or secured to the owner when that which is done is to be regarded as a taking of private property for public use within the meaning of the 5th Amendment of the Constitution; and of course in its exercise of the power to regulate commerce Congress may not override the provision that just compensation must be made when private property is taken for public use. What is private property within the meaning of that Amendment, or what is a taking of private property for public use, is not always easy to determine. No decision of this court has announced a rule that will embrace every case. But what has been said in some cases involving the general question will assist us in determining whether the present plaintiff has been denied the protection secured by the constitutional provision in question.

In Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 181, 20 L. ed. 557, 561, the court construed a provision of the Constitution of Wisconsin declaring that 'the property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor;' observing that it was a provision almost identical in language with the one relating to the same subject in the Federal Constitution. In that case it appeared that a public improvement in a navigable water was made under local statutory authority, whereby the case that the extrement qualification of the and its use for every purpose destroyed. Referring to some adjudged cases which went, as the court observed, beyond sound principle, it was said that 'it remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking within the meaning of the Constitution, and that this proposition is not in conflict with the weight of judicial authority in this country, and certainly not with sound principle.'

That case was relied upon in Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642, 25 L. ed. 336, 338, as establishing the invalidity of certain municipal acts looking to the improvement of a public highway. But this court said that 'acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision. They do not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from the state or its agents, or give him any right of action. This is supported by an immense weight of authority.' It was observed in the same case that the extrmest qualification of the doctrine was that found in Pumpelly's Case, and that case was referred to as holding nothing more than that 'the permanent flooding of private property may be regarded as a 'taking," because there would be in such case 'a physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.' In Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 341, 343, 37 L. ed. 463, 473, 474, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622, there was an actual taking of certain locks and dams which had been constructed and maintained, under competent authority, by a navigation company; and the question was whether the franchise to take tolls for the use of the locks was to be deemed a part of the property taken for which compensation must be made. This court held that it was, remarking: 'The franchise is a vested right. The state has power to grant it. It may retake it, as it may take other private property, for public uses, upon the payment of just compensation. A like, though a superior, power exists in the national government. It may take it for public purposes, and take it even against the will of the state; but it can no more take the franchise which the state has given than it can any private property belonging to an individual.' Again, in the same case: 'It is also suggested that the government does not take this franchise; that it does not need any authority from the state for the exaction of tolls, if it desires to exact them; that it only appropriates the tangible property, and then either makes the use of it free to all, or exacts such tolls as it sees fit, or transfers the property to a new corporation of its own creation, with such a franchise to take tolls as it chooses to give. But this franchise goes with the property; and the navigation company, which owned it, is deprived of it. The government takes it away from the company, whatever use it may make of it; and the question of just compensation is not determined by the value to the government which takes, but the value to the individual from whom the property is taken; and when by the taking of the tangible property the owner is actually deprived of the franchise to collect tolls, just compensation requires payment, not merely of the value of the tangible property itself, but also of that of the franchise of which he is deprived.'

But the case most analogous to the present one is that of Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271, 275, 276, 41 L. ed. 996, 998, 1002, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578. That was an action in the court of claims to recover damages resulting from the construction of a dike by the United States in the Ohio river, near the plaintiff's farm on Neville island, a short distance below Pittsburg.

From the finding of facts in that case it appears that at the time the dike was constructed Mrs. Gibson's farm was in a high state of cultivation, with a frontage of 1,000 feet on the main channel of the Ohio river, and had a landing that was used in shipping products from and in bringing supplies to it, and that there was no other landing on the farm which the owner could use in shipping products and in receiving supplies; that the dike was constructed under the authority of an act of Congress appropriating money for improving the Ohio river; that the owner was unable to use the landing for the shipment of products from and supplies to the farm for the greater part of the gardening season on account of the dike obstructing the passage of boats, and could only use the landing at a high stage of water; that after the dike was made she could not, during the ordinary stage of water, ship products from or receive supplies for her farm, without going over the farms of her neighbors to reach another landing; and that in consequence of the construction and maintenance of the dike the plaintiff's farm had been reduced in value from $600 to $150 or $200 per acre. It was further found that the plaintiff's access to the navigable part of the river was not entirely cut off; that at a 9-foot stage of water, which frequently occurred during November, December, March, April, and May, she could get into her dock in any manner, while from a 3-foot stage of water she could communicate with the navigable channel through a chute, and at any time haul out to the channel by wagon; that no water was thrown back on the land by the building of the dike; and that the dike itself did not come into physical contact with the land, and was constructed in the exercise of a claimed right to improve the navigation of the river.

This court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the United States. It said: 'All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and, although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various states and individual owners under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect to navigation created in favor of the Federal government by the Constitution,'-citing South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 23 L. ed. 782; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 38 L. ed. 331, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 40 L. ed. 490, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345. Again, in the same case: 'The 5th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not 'be taken for public use without just compensation.' Here, however, the damage of which Mrs. Gibson complained was not the result of the taking of any part of her property, whether upland or submerged, or a direct invasion thereof, but the incidental consequence of the lawful and proper exercise of a governmental power.' 'Moreover,' the court said, 'riparian ownership is subject to the obligation to suffer the consequences of the improvement of navigation in the exercise of the dominant right of the government in that regard. The legislative authority for these works consisted simply in an appropriation for their construction, but this was an assertion of a right belonging to the government, to which riparian property was subject, and not of a right to appropriate private property, not burdened with such servitude, to public purposes.'

In the light of these adjudications can it be held that Scranton, the plaintiff, is entitled, by reason of the construction of the pier in question, to compensation for the destruction of his right, as riparian owner, of access from his land to the navigable part of the river immediately in front of it?

It is said that he is so entitled in virtue of the decision in Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 504, 505, 19 L. ed. 984, 986. The report of that case shows that Yates owned a wharf on a navigable river within the limits of the city of Milwaukee, and that the city by an ordinance declared the wharf to be a nuisance, and ordered it to be abated. There was no proof whatever in the record that the wharf was in fact an obstruction to navigation, or a nuisance, except the declaration to that effect in the city ordinance; and Yates brought suit to enjoin interference with it by the city. This court held that the mere declaration by the city that Yates's wharf was a nuisance did not make it one, saying: 'It is a doctrine not to be tolerated in this country, that a municipal corporation, without any general laws either of the city or of the state, within which a given structure can be shown to be a nuisance, can, by its mere declaration that it is one, subject it to removal by any person supposed to be aggrieved, or even by the city itself.' This, as this court said in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40, 38 L. ed. 331, 346, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548, was quite sufficient to dispose of the case in Yates's favor, and indicated the point adjudged. A proper disposition of the case required nothing more to be said. But the opinion of the court went further, and after observing, upon the authority of Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 25, 17 L. ed. 29, and St. Paul & P. R. Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272, 19 L. ed. 74, that a riparian owner is entitled to access to the navigable part of the river from the front of his lot, subject to such general rules and regulations as the legislature might prescribe for the protection of the rights of the public, said: 'This riparian right is property, and is valuable, and though it must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously destroyed or impaired. It is a right of which, when once vested, the owner can only be deprived in accordance with established law, and, if necessary that it be taken for the public good, upon due compensation.'

The decision in Yates v. Milwaukee cannot be regarded as an adjudication upon the particular point involved in the present case. That, as we have seen, was a case in which the riparian owner had in conformity with law erected a wharf in front of his upland in order to have access to navigable water. The city of Milwaukee attempted arbitrarily and capriciously to destroy or remove the wharf that had lawfully come into existence, and was not shown, in any appropriate mode, to have been an obstruction to navigation. It was a case in which a municipal corporation intended the actual destruction of tangible property belonging to a riparian owner and lawfully used by him in reaching navigable water, and not, like this, a case of the exercise in a proper manner of an admitted governmental power resulting indirectly or incidentally in the loss of the citizen's right of access to navigation,-a right never exercised by him in the construction of a wharf before the improvement in question was made by the government.

While the present case differs in its facts from any case heretofore decided by this court, it is embraced by principles of constitutional law that have become firmly established.

The Constitution invests Congress with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. This power includes the power to prescribe 'the rule by which commerce is to be governed;' 'is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution;' and 'comprehends navigation within the limits of every state in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several states, or with the Indian tribes." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196, 197, 6 L. ed. 23, 70.

In Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 724, 18 L. ed. 96, 99, the court said: 'Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a state other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress.'

In South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4, 11, 12, 23 L. ed. 782, 784, the court said that Congress 'may build lighthouses in the bed of the stream. It may construct jetties. It may require all navigators to pass along a prescribed channel, and may close any other channel to their passage.'

In Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 696, 26 L. ed. 238, 239, the court, observing that the power of Congress to regulate commerce was without limitation, said: 'It authorizes Congress to prescribe the conditions upon which commerce in all its forms shall be conducted between our citizens and the citizens or subjects of other countries, and between the citizens of the several states, and to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety. And as commerce embraces navigation, the improvement of harbors and bays along our coast, and of navigable rivers within the states connecting with them, falls within the power.'

In Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 9, 20, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 411, Mr. Justice Bradley, holding the circuit court, said: 'Such being the character of the state's ownership of the land under water,-an ownership held, not for the purpose of emolument, but for public use, especially the public use of navigation and commerce,-the question arises whether it is a kind of property susceptible of pecuniary compensation, within the meaning of the Constitution. The 5th Amendment provides only that private property shall not be taken without compensation, making no reference to public property. But, if the phrase may have an application broad enough to include all property and ownership, the question would still arise whether the appropriation of a few square feet of the river bottom to the foundation of a bridge which is to be used for the transportation of an extensive commerce in aid and relief of that afforded by the waterway is at all a diversion of the property from its original public use. It is not so considered when sea walls, piers, wing-dams, and other structures are erected for the purpose of aiding commerce by improving and preserving the navigation. Why should it be deemed such when (without injury to the navigation) erections are made for the purpose of aiding and enlarging commerce beyond the capacity of the navigable stream itself, and of all the navigable waters of the country? It is commerce, and not navigation, which is the great object of constitutional care. The power to regulate commerce is the basis of the power to regulate navigation and navigable waters and streams, and these are so completely subject to the control of Congress, as subsidiary to commerce, that it has become usual to call the entire navigable waters of the country the navigable waters of the United States. It matters little whether the United States has or has not the theoretical ownership and dominion in the waters, or the land under them; it has, what is more, the regulation and control of them for the purposes of commerce. So wide and extensive is the operation of this power that no state can place any obstruction in or upon any navigable waters against the will of Congress, and Congress may summarily remove such obstructions at its pleasure. And all this power is derived from the power 'to regulate commerce.' Is this power stayed when it comes to the question of erecting a bridge for the purposes of commerce across a navigable stream? We think not. We think that the power to regulate commerce between the states extends, not only to the control of the navigable waters of the country and the lands under them, for the purposes of navigation, but for the purpose of erecting piers, bridges, and all other instrumentalities of commerce which, in the judgment of Congress, may be necessary or expedient.'

As much was said in argument about the decisions in New York it may be well here to refer to some of the rulings of the highest court of that state. In Rumsey v. New York & N. E. R. Co. 133 N. Y. 79, 85, 89, 30 N. E. 654, the court of appeals of New York, referring to the prior case of Gould v. Hudson River R. Co. 6 N. Y. 522, said: 'It was there held that the owner of lands on the Hudson river has no private right or property in the waters or the shore between high and low water mark, and therefore is not entitled to compensation from a railroad company which, in pursuance of a grant from the legislature, constructs a railroad along the shore, between high and low water mark, so as to cut off all communications between the land and the river otherwise than across the railroad. It is believed that this proposition is not supported by any other judicial decision in this state, and if we were dealing with the question now as an original one it would not be difficult to show that the judgment in that case was a departure from precedent and contrary to reason and justice.' Again, in the same case: 'It must now, we think, be regarded as the law in this state that an owner of land on a public river is entitled to such damages as he may have sustained against a railroad company that constructs its road across his water front and deprives him of access to the navigable part of the stream, unless the owner has granted the right, or it has been obtained by the power of eminent domain. This principle cannot, of course, be extended so as to interfere with the right of the state to improve the navigation of the river, or with the power of Congress to regulate commerce under the provisions of the Federal Constitution.'

But in a later case in New York relating to this subject-Sage v. New York, 154 N. Y. 61, 69, 38 L. R. A. 606, 47 N. E. 1096-the court of appeals, after observing that the court in Rumsey v. New York & N. E. R. Co. had been careful to say that the principle announced by it was not to be extended so as to interfere with the right of the state to improve the navigation of the river, or with the power of Congress to regulate commerce under the provisions of the Federal Constitution, said: 'While we think it is a logical deduction from the decisions in this state that, as against the general public, through their official representatives, riparian owners have no right to prevent important public improvements upon tidewater for the benefit of commerce, the principle upon which the rule rests, although sometimes foreshadowed, has not been clearly set forth. Although, as against individuals or the unorganized public, riparian owners have special rights to the tideway that are recognized and protected by law, as against the general public, as organized and represented by government, they have no rights that do not yield to commercial necessities, except the right of pre-emption, when conferred by statute, and the right to wharfage, when protected by a grant and covenant on the part of the state, as in the Langdon [93 N. Y. 129] and Williams [105 N. Y. 419, 11 N. E. 829]Cases. I think that the rule rests upon the principle of implied reservation, and that in every grant of lands bounded by navigable waters where the tide ebbs and flows, made by the Crown or the state as trustee for the public, there is reserved by implication the right to so improve the water front as to aid navigation for the benefit of the general public, without compensation to the riparian owner. The implication springs from the title to the tideway, the nature of the subject of the grant, and its relation to navigable tidewater, which has been aptly called the highway of the world. The common law recognizes navigation as an interest of paramount importance to the public.'

All the cases concur in holding that the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and therefore navigation, is paramount, and is unrestricted except by the limitations upon its authority by the Constitution. Of course, every part of the Constitution is as binding upon Congress as upon the people. The guaranties prescribed by it for the security of private property must be respected by all. But whether navigation upon waters over which Congress may exert its authority requires improvement at all, or improvement in a particular way, are matters wholly within its discretion; and the judiciary is without power to control or defeat the will of Congress, so long as that branch of the government does not transcend the limits established by the supreme law of the land. Is the broad power with which Congress is invested burdened with the condition that a riparian owner whose land borders upon a navigable water of the United States shall be compensated for his right of access to navigability whenever such right ceases to be of value solely in consequence of the improvement of navigation by means of piers resting upon submerged lands away from the shore line? We think not. The question before us does not depend upon the inquiry whether the title to the submerged lands on which the new south pier rests is in the state or in the riparian owner. It is the settled rule in Michigan that 'the title of the riparian owner extends to the middle line of the lake or stream of the inland waters.' Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co. 62 Mich. 636, 30 N. W. 469, and authorities there cited. But it is equally well settled in that state that the rights of the riparian owner are subject to the public easement or servitude of navigation. Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18, 32, 77 Am. Dec. 435; Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 195, 207, 100 Am. Dec. 154. So that, whether the title to the submerged lands of navigable waters is in the state or in the riparian owners, it was acquired subject to the rights which the public have in the navigation of such waters. The primary use of the waters and the lands under them is for purposes of navigation, and the erection of piers in them to improve navigation for the public is entirely consistent with such use, and infringes no right of the riparian owner. Whatever the nature of the interest of a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has no direct connection with the navigation of such water. It is a qualified title, a bare technical title, not at his absolute disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all times subordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or demanded by the public right of navigation. In Lorman v. Benson, above cited, the supreme court of Michigan, speaking by Justice Campbell, declared the right of navigation to be one to which all others were subservient. The learned counsel for the plaintiff frankly states that compensation cannot be demanded for the appropriation of the submerged lands in question, and that the United States under the power to regulate commerce has an unquestioned right to occupy them for a lawful purpose and in a lawful manner. This must be so,-certainly in every case where the use of the submerged lands is necessary or appropriate in improving navigation. But the contention is that compensation must be made for the loss of the plaintiff's access from his upland to navigability, incidentally resulting from the occupancy of the submerged lands, even if the construction and maintenance of a pier resting upon them be necessary or valuable in the proper improvement of navigation. We cannot assent to this view. If the riparian owner cannot enjoy access to navigability because of the improvement of navigation by the construction away from the shore line of works in a public navigable river or water, and if such right of access ceases alone for that reason to be of value, there is not, within the meaning of the Constitution, a taking of private property for public use, but only a consequential injury to a right which must be enjoyed, as was said in the Yates Case, 'in due subjection to the rights of the public,'-an injury resulting incidentally from the exercise of a governmental power for the benefit of the general public, and from which no duty arises to make or secure compensation to the riparian owner. The riparian owner acquired the right of access to navigability subject to the contingency that such right might become valueless in consequence of the erection, under competent authority, of structures on the submerged lands in front of his property for the purpose of improving navigation. When erecting the pier in question, the government had no object in view except, in the interest of the public, to improve navigation. It was not designed arbitrarily or capriciously to destroy rights belonging to any riparian owner. What was done was manifestly necessary to meet the demands of international and interstate commerce. In our opinion, it was not intended that the paramount authority of Congress to improve the navigation of the public navigable waters of the United States should be crippled by compelling the government to make compensation for the injury to a riparian owner's right of access to navigability, that might incidentally result from an improvement ordered by Congress. The subject with which Congress dealt was navigation. That which was sought to be accomplished was simply to improve navigation on the waters in question so as to meet the wants of the vast commerce passing and to pass over them. Consequently the agents designated to perform the work ordered or authorized by Congress had the right to proceed in all proper ways without taking into account the injury that might possibly or indirectly result from such work to the right of access by riparian owners to navigability.

It follows from what has been said that the pier in question was the property of the United States, and that when the defendant refused to plaintiff the privilege of using it as a wharf or landing place he violated no right secured to the latter by the Constitution.

We are of opinion that the court below correctly held that the plaintiff had no such right of property in the submerged lands on which the pier in question rests as entitles him, under the Constitution, to be compensated for any loss of access from his upland to navigability, resulting from the erection and maintenance of such pier by the United States in order to improve, and which manifestly did improve, the navigation of a public navigable water.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is therefore affirmed.


Notes

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This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).

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