Page:The World as Will and Idea - Schopenhauer, tr. Haldane and Kemp - Volume 2.djvu/498

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488
SECOND BOOK. CHAPTER XX.

On the other hand, that the will itself is sick, as Brandis repeatedly expresses himself in his book, "Ueber die Anwendung der Kälte," which I have quoted in the first part of my essay, "Ueber den Willen in der Natur," is a gross misunderstanding. When I weigh this, and at the same time observe that in his earlier book, "Ueber die Lebenskraft," of 1795, Brandis betrayed no suspicion that this force is in itself the will, but, on the contrary, says there, page 13: "It is impossible that the vital force can be that which we only know through our consciousness, for most movements take place without our consciousness. The assertion that this, of which the only characteristic known to us is consciousness, also affects the body with out consciousness is at the least quite arbitrary and unproved;" and page 14: "Haller's objections to the opinion that all living movements are the effect of the soul are, as I believe, quite unanswerable;" when I further reflect that he wrote his book, "Ueber die Anwendung der Kälte," in which all at once the will appears so decidedly as the vital force, in his seventieth year, an age at which no one as yet has conceived for the first time original fundamental thoughts; when, lastly, I bear in mind that he makes use of my exact expressions, "will and idea," and not of those which are far more commonly used by others, "the faculties of desire and of knowledge," I am now convinced, contrary to my earlier supposition, that he borrowed his fundamental thought from me, and with the usual honesty which prevails at the present day in the learned world, said nothing about it. The particulars about this will be found in the second (and third) edition of my work, "Ueber den Willen in der Natur," p. 14.

Nothing is more fitted to confirm and illustrate the thesis with which we are occupied in this chapter than Bichat's justly celebrated book, "Sur la vie et la mort." His reflections and mine reciprocally support each other, for his are the physiological commentary on mine, and mine are the philosophical commentary on his, and one