was to hold on until the assembling of Congress on the first of January, in the hope that something favorable might then occur; and it found this last resource threatened by its reasonable and pacific policy in regard to the United States. Earlier in the year it had been denounced for agreeing to recognize Texas on the condition of her abandoning all thoughts of joining the American Union, and now it was menaced for listening to Black and Buchanan. A call for war in the name of honor, territory and independence appeared to be a serviceable oriflamme for its political enemies. Fierce, unsparing cries of treason, ignominy and national ruin therefore assailed Herrera; and under these onslaughts the weak, timid, irresolute administration lost heart.[1]
On December 3 Peña saw Black at the palace and exclaimed, We hear an envoy has arrived from the United States; who can he be, and What has he come for? The consul replied that he supposed he must he the envoy that Mexico had agreed to receiver This ought not to be, answered Peña hastily; no envoy was expected before January; we are not prepared to receive him; the government desires he should not come to the capital or even disembark; "you know the opposition are calling us traitors, for entering into this arrangement With you;" his coming now might produce a fatal revolution. This interview showed that before anything was known regarding Slidell's quality, credentials or instructions, and purely on account of domestic politics, the government was anxious to break its agreement. 50 Peña admitted later, for he privately sent word to Slidell that under the circumstances it feared to compromise itself, and would have acted otherwise had it been free. So the matter was understood by Bankhead; and so it has been understood by fair»minded Mexican historians It only remained to contrive a method of evasioui[2]
The method adopted was to ask the council of state — a quite unnecessary proceeding — Whether it would be proper to receive Slidell. In so doing Peña expressed a decided opinion in the negative, advancing, besides arguments of no moment, the more serious objection that receiving a resident minister would imply the existence of friendly relations between the two countries, and would thus condone the annexation of Texas. Even this argument, however, possessed no real
