Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 24.pdf/552

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Ohio's New Constitution with too many popular proposals. But when a measure has been initiated by the direct method, the legislature can enact a competing measure only at ran dom, on the chance that it will not be sustained on the referendum, and for this reason is likely often to hesitate to pro pose a competing measure when the latter is clearly desirable. The provi sion for a referendum on all laws is also likely to cause the legislature to put aside its objections too readily from motives of political expediency, and can not be said to make for a fuller sense of legislative responsibility. The weakening of the executive check on legislation is obviously due to the feeling that the checks now provided by the initiative and referendum make a more limited power of veto sufficient. The principle of direct popular nom inations expresses the growing distrust of the party convention system, and the desire to secure a legislature more respon sive to the popular will. Professor Frank J. Goodnow has written of these political features of the new constitution:1 When we consider the great ease in consti tutional amendment, the great increase in the powers of the legislature, the decrease both in the powers of the couits and in the independence of the judges, and finally the powers to be granted to a comparatively small percentage of the electors of the state on the one hand to force action by the legislature and on the other hand to prevent action by that body by subjecting their action or their failure to act to the direct approval of the people, it must be con ceded that the Ohio Constitutional Convention has traveled a long distance on the road to an almost purely democratic government. If the proposals which have been made are adopted, the government which the people of Ohio will enjoy will certainly be a government of the people and by the people. Whether it will be a government for the people is still to be deter mined. 1 New York Times, Aug. 18, 1912.

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STATUTORY MATTERS No. 18 — Special Legislative Sessions. Would restrict the General Assembly in special session to the consideration of only such matters as stated in the Governor's call for the extra ses-

Provisions Affecting Courts and Litigation

The judiciary provisions of the amend ments primarily deal with the organiza tion of the court system of the state and with the jurisdiction of the various courts. They thus treat largely of mat ters properly statutory. The new sys tem relieves the Supreme Court by transferring a substantial portion of its appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals. The changes make for greater expedition of procedure, and for the prompter determination of questions of public interest by the Supreme Court. Simplification of procedure is aimed at by increasing the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, by giving an enlarged final jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals, and by limiting the power of the Court of Appeals to reverse judg ments. In two respects, however, the changes made are of far-reaching importance as affecting the fundamental law, namely, those regarding opinions by a divided court and the failure of the accused to testify in criminal cases. These changes are found in the following amendments: No. 19 — Re-org;mization of Court System. "One trial, one review" — the maxim of Presi dent Taft — is the principal feature of this change, which leaves the Supreme Court un changed in number of judges. Gives it original jurisdiction in all cases in which it now has original jurisdiction, but gives in addition the writs of prohibition and certiorari. Prohibi tion allows it to order inferior courts to cease objectionable practices and later to take to itself cases of great public interest to decide. Allows laws to be passed providing direct review in Supreme Court of all orders of administrative