Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 24.pdf/437

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The Green Bag

injury, without denial of reasonable oppor tunity for just and honest enterprise." "Limitations of the Statutory Power of Majority Stockholders to Dissolve a Corpora tion." By William H. Fain. 25 Harvard Law Renew 677 (June).

Criminal Procedure. See Penology. Direct Government. "The Direct Primary Experiment." By Evans Woollen. Atlantic, v. 110, p. 41 (July). "It was to be expected that party efficiency would deteriorate under the decentralizing in fluences of a direct primary." See Government, Recall of Decisions, Recall of Judges. Eminent Domain. "The Power of 'Com pulsory Purchase' under the Law of England." By William D. McNulty. 21 Yak Law Journal 639 Quote). This power, known in this country as that of eminent domain, is not limited in England by any constitutional provisions as with us, but the legislation adopted under it is more care fully drawn than in this country, and we may study English methods to advantage for the purpose of learning to avoid excessive litiga tion in connection with analogous provisions of our own laws. Evidence. "Written Evidence and Alter ations." By Adelbert Moot. 25 Harvard Law Review 691 (June). General Jurisprudence. "The Lien or Equitable Theory of the Mortgage — Some Generalizations." By Edgar N. Durfee. 10 Michigan Law Review 587 (June). "If it be objected that a legal lien without possession, an 'hypothecation' in our terms of jurisprudence, is an anomaly in our law, it may be answered that the treatment, as creating a mere lien, of what is in form a conveyance on condition subsequent, is itself anomalous and that the anomaly is certainly not made greater by treating it as creating a legal lien than by treating it as creating an equitable lien — but contrariwise. It may be further answered that a non-possessory legal lien is not wholly anoma lous, as we have, not to go beyond our modern law, examples of it in judgment and execution liens and in mechanics' liens. But conceding that a legal lien of this sort is to some extent anomalous in our law, is this not such an anom aly as, from the point of view of legal tradition, is to be expected in any radical reform of the law. And, from the point of view of jurispru

dence, is not this anomaly but a natural and logical step in the process of refining the pledgeidea? And would not the statutes denying ejectment to the mortagagee have been un necessary and would not those statutes have received a liberal construction in all the states, were it not that in Anglo-American law the pledge has been chiefly represented by its ruder forms, as a result of which the essence of the pledge-idea has been obscured?" See Corporations. Government. "Separation of Powers: Ad ministrative Exercise of Legislative and Judi cial Power." By T. R. Powell. Political Sci ence Quarterly, v. 27, p. 215 (June). The article deals more with legal doctrine than political theory, extended examination being made of judicial decisions. The writer avoids the dogmatic position, clearly recog nizing the fictitious character of the distinction between powers. He shows that even the courts have had to recede somewhat from the tradi tional doctrine. That doctrine, however, still protects individual citizens from disturbance in the enjoyment of their rights by one branch of the government not acting concurrently with at least one other branch. Such concurrence is made necessary except in those cases where an individual's privilege, rather than his right, is at stake, or where the rights of the public are treated by the courts as the prime consideration. "A Draft of a Frame of Government." By T. S. Tyng. Political Science Quarterly, v. 27, p. 193 (June). Foreign observation usually regards the legis lative department of our government distinctly inferior in efficiency to the judicial and execu tive branches. Recent experience has shown how the processes of legislation may be improved upon. This experience is summed up in the concrete form of a rough, tentative draft of a proposed state constitution not modeled after that of any existing state. The writer herein proposes that the members of the upper house shall be eligible for pensions, after a given period of service, that the Governor shall exercise larger power especially with regard to legisla tive and budget proposals, that the popular control over legislation shall be preserved, and that the removal of judges shall be made easier, this latter responsibility however, being borne by the legislators, without a popular recall of judges. Mr. Tyng's draft is a moderately and intelligently written document which will as sume importance in the eyes of students of