Latest Important Cases they were recognized as such (McDonald v. Boston Gen. Hospital, 120 Mass. 432; Benton
v. Trustees of City Hospital, 140 id. 13). . . . ‘In several jurisdictions, however, the immunity of charitable corporations for the torts of their trustees or servants has been made dependent on the relation the plaintiff bore to the corporation. In all it is recognized that the beneficiary of a chari table trust may not hold the corporation liable for the neglect of its servants. This is un questionably the law of this state (Collins v.
N.
Y.
Post-Graduate Med.
App. Div. 63; 89 Hun. 73;
Joel v.
School,
39
Woman's Hospital,
see also Pryor v. Hospital, 15
N. Y. Supp. 622, and Haas v. Missionary Soc'y, 26 id. 868). It is also the law in this state that there is similar immunity from liability in the case of a charitable institu tion of a quasi-penal character, as against an inmate committed to it for punishment or reformation (Corbett v. St. Vincent's Industrial School,
177 N. Y. 16). . . .
On
the other hand, in Rector, etc., of Church of Ascension v. Buckhart (3 Hill 193) a recovery against a religious corporation by a person injured by the falling of a church wall was upheld. The authority of this case has never been questioned, and the decision is condu sive against the doctrine of total immunity. "So much for authority. If, however, we are to consider the question of the liability of the defendant an open one despite the decision in Rector, etc., of Church of Ascension
v. Buckharl (supra), we feel clear than on reason and principle the defendant's claim of immunity should not prevail. In the case of Powers v. Mass. Homoeopathic Hospital (47 C. C. A. 122) and in the case we have cited from the courts of Michigan [Bruce v. Cent. III. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230] there will be found not only an elaborate review of the authorities, but an exhaustive discussion of the grounds on which the claim of universal immunity is sought to be sustained. In the earlier case Judge Lowell, of the U. S. Circuit Court, shows that the analogy of the immunity of private trust estates does not support the doctrine." The Court expressed concurrence in the reasoning of Judge Lowell and of Judge Car penter in the two cases last cited. Hordern v. Salvation Army, decided Sept. 27, reported
in N. Y. Law jour. Oct. 6.
657
workmen's Compensation. New York Act Constitutional-—Fonrleenlh Amendment Not Violaled—-Liabilily without Fault. N. Y. The constitutionality of the New York workmen's compensation act amending the labor law affecting workmen’s compensation in certain dangerous employments, which became effective September 1. has been up held by Justice Pound of the New York Supreme Court in Ives v. South Buffalo Rail way Company. The plaintiff showed that he was a switchman and was injured while on duty. He did not claim that there had been negligence on the part of the defendant, but he established the fact that there had been no “serious or willful misconduct on his part." The grounds on which the law was attacked were thus stated by the Court:— "Defendant maintains that under our system of constitutional government the
incorporation into our law of the English law of workmen's compensation is beyond the powers of the Legislature. First, because the act in question deprives the defendant of liberty and property without due process of law, and denies it the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu tion, and Artcile 1, section 6, of the con stitution of this state. Second, because it violates the right of trial by jury guaranteed by Article 1, section 2, of the constitution of this state.
Third, because it limits the amount
recoverable in actions to recover damages for injuries resulting in death in contraven tion of Article 1, section 18, of the constitution
of this state." The Court quoted an opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect that the federal Constitution should not be so construed as to deprive the states of the power to amend their laws as they may deem best for the public welfare. "It is established that statutes applicable solely to railroads do not deny to railroads the equal protection of the laws," and it also said that a classification of "dangerous em ployments" for the purposes of the act must be upheld. “That the Legislature," it said, "had the power to deal with the question of employers’ liability on a basis other than fault is not clear beyond peradventure, but every presumption is in favor of the consti tutionality of the act."
