Review of Periodicals "From the stand int of the earlier con ception of the W0 ‘commerce,’ as used in the commerce clause, we have, as a definition thereof, ‘the transportation of the tangible.’ Such definition came indeed to be applied to the intangible also, conspicuously so to communication by telegraph. Yet such appli cation was but partial and limited, b reason of the continuing influence of the ear‘ r con ception. Thus, it is still refused applimtion to the mere negotiation of a contract between persons situated at the time in difierent states, conspicuously so as to contracts of insurance. But it is allowed applimtion to such negotia tion, by reason of its being incidental to what is within the sco of the commerce clause— thus, where pe orrnance of the contract in volves trans rtation of the intangible. It is submitted tat it likewise has such applica tion where such performance involves trans gortation of the intangible, but thus far it as been denied such application, especially with respect to contracts to furnish instruc tron by correspondence." "The Segregation of White and Colored Passengers on Interstate Trains." By J. Newton Barker. 19 Yale Law journal 445 (Apr.).
"State statutes a 'nst the intermingling of white and 0010 passen ers are valid in so far as they are constru and applied to intra-state transportation, but such statutes
cannot interfere with interstate trains carry ing Xassengers between interstate points. . . . “ federal statute is necessary to compel interstate carriers to separate colored and white passengers, and if such legislation could be accomplished the separation of the races in transportation would be a worthy regula tion of commerce." _ See Federal Incorporation, Rate Regula tron.
Judicial Interpretation. "The Joke's on You: How Your Chosen Representatives Work the Joker Game on Legislation." By Samuel Hopkins Adams. American Maga zine, v. 70, p. 51 (May). According to this author, "'okers" are not
confined exclusivel to legis tion, but are found in the judicia interpretation of statutes. To illustrate, he says that the United States
Supreme Court injected into the commodities clause of the interstate commerce law. pro hibiting carriers from owning any interest in the commodities carried, the words "legal or
eguitable," craftily perverting the meaning 0 the Act. Mr. Adams should have labeled this criti cisrn, "This is a joke," as it is too poor a one
to laugh at. Jury Trials. "Right of Trial by Jury."
By
Lynne Fox Clinton, of Boise, Idaho. 3 Lawyer
and Banker 120 (Apr.). "The assertion that the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee to its citi zens the right of a trial by jury in the state
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courts is so forei to the general belief of most people that it is often startling not only to laymen but to many lawyers. But it rs undoubtedly true, whether a salient strength or weakness in our nationality as one may honestly view it."
See Procedure. Labor Unions. "The Right to Strike: Its Limitations." By Joseph J. Feely. North American Review, v. 191, p. 644 (May).
"Certainly the interest of the public should have as prompt and as effective consideration and protection as those of the individual or group of individuals. . . . Such paramount right of the public would seem to be a suffi cient justification for legislative action creating tribunals to which matters growin out of in dustrial disputes involving the Paglia welfare should be left for compulsory arbitration and settlement, as soon as the creation of such a
tribunal be deemed expedient." Lew Reporting. "Loose Leaf Law Reports." By W. E. Singleton. 26 Law Quarterly Re view 156 (Apr.).
"While the more complicated portions of Mr. Carden's scheme see 22 Green Bag 182] could not well be a o ted by the ordinary subscriber, he has in t e suggestion of sepa rate publication of sin le cases hit on a most valuable idea. It is oped that it will be speedily acted on." Legal History. "The Place of Writing in Conveyancing and Contract." By J. Andrew Strahan. 26 Law Quarterly Review 113 (Apr.) _ "The authority of the deed both in con veyancing and contract was fully established long before the Chancellor began to enforce uses. Now for several centuries after he began to enforce them we have no reports of his decisions. . . . But nevertheless from the very first the Chancellor did make law and did lay down principles. . . . "The counsel who practised before the Chancellor [at the end of the fourteenth cen tury] who dealt thus freely with the bene ficial ownership were the same men who practised before the common law judges who were bound hand and foot by the doctrines of seisin and estop l by deed in dealing with legal ownership an with contracts. It cannot but be that theg were influenced in their practice before t e common law judges by their practice before the Chancellors. And it is my contention that it was the notions they derived from their practice before the Chancellor which laid at any rate the founda tion of the law of simple contract without deed and without writing. . . . thiswithout day, trusts of pure rsonalty be "To made wr'itin , andpirusts of may land may be made without eed, though writing is necessary to prove the latter or to alienate any equitable interest. But practice does not always follow the law, and it is now the practice to use deeds in creating trusts and assigning equitable interests in every case where a deed would have been used if the
