Covenants Without the Sword because its most ardent advocate was Secretary Root, facile princeps the leader of our American bar. In his instruc tions to the American delegates, Secre tary Root said:— "If there could be a tribunal which would pass upon questions between nations with the same impartial and impersonal judgment that the Supreme Court of the United States gives to questions arising between citizens of the different states, or between foreign citizens and the citizens of the United States, there can be no doubt that nations would be more ready to submit their controversies to its decision than they are now to take the chances of arbitration. It should be your efforts to bring about in the second Conference a development of the Hague Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods and under a sense of judicial responsibility. These judges should be selected from the different countries so that the different systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be fairly represented. The Court should be made of such dignity, consideration and rank that the best and ablest jurists will accept appoint ment to it, and that the whole world will have absolute confidence in its judgments." It would consume too much time to go into the details of the plan for this Court as eventually formulated and ac cepted. Suffice it to say that the plan proposed, for political reasons, appar ently did not contemplate the abolition of the existing so-called Permanent Arbi tration Tribunal, but it covered with considerable skill the defects inherent in that abortive institution. The new Court is referred to in the plan as the Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice; and the theory and detail of its organiza tion carry out the suggestions of Secre tary Root. The Conference, however, merely approved the organization of such a Court and commended to the signatory powers the adoption of the
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plan agreed upon, leaving to be deter mined the method by which judges should be selected. Upon this question an irreconcilable difference . of opinion developed at the Conference, and the whole project was defeated. Perhaps I should also allude to the existing "Hague Tribunal," with certain executive functions of possible useful ness, as well as to the "International Prize Court" composed of fifteen judges which the Hague Conference actually did agree upon. This Court, in case of actual war, should prove of real service, though it loses much of its value as a real tribunal by the provisions of Article 7 of the Convention creating it, which provides :— "If a question of law to be decided is cov ered by a treaty in force between the belliger ent captor and a power which is itself or the subject or citizen of which is a party to the proceedings, the Court is governed by the provisions of the said treaty. In the absence of such provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognized rule exists, the Court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." The obvious limitations of this tribunal may be somewhat overcome by the work of a Naval Conference of the leading nations recently convened by England, at which a convention of seventy-six articles was agreed upon as to what the delegates believe to be the law on such subjects as blockade, contraband, un neutral prizes, determination of enemy character of ships, convoy, resistance to search, compensation for illegal seizure, etc. This declaration of "what ought to be law" must, of course, be ratified by the signatory powers, after which presumably it becomes "law"—but hardly international law in any juristic sense. It is also worth noting that towards the end of this London Con ference the American delegation sub
