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within its parks and driveways, New York City passed an ordinance forbidding the operation within them of any vehicle more than ten feet high. In People v. Shellenberg, 117 New York Supplement 820, the company employing defendant, who had been con victed of driving a double-decked motor omnibus exceeding the prescribed height, con tended that it had the right conferred by statute to operate its stages without restric tion as to height. The New York Supreme Court, assuming that the company had the right to run its automobiles on Riverside Drive, thought it had no right so to operate them as to violate a city ordinance, which if otherwise valid could not be impeached merely because it interfered with the use of a particular kind of stage which the company operated. If it chose to select a route which included a public park, it thereby subjected itself to reasonable regulation. That vehicles of excessive height will probably injure the lower branches of trees that overshadow the drive and thus impair its usefulness is selfevident. It was held that no ground for the invalidity of the ordinance was shown. Obstruction of Sidewalks by Street Peddlers and Bootblacks. Neb. The city of Lincoln, Neb., passed an ordi nance making it unlawful for any person to erect any booth, shed, stand, or other obstruc tion upon the sidewalk for the sale of mer chandise, or to be used for shining boots. In Chapman v. City of Lincoln, 121 N. W. Rep. 596, plaintiffs complained that other mer chants were allowed to use the sidewalks for the display of their goods, so why should not they? The Nebraska Supreme Court held that simply because the city, perhaps illegally, had seen fit to allow its merchants to display upon the walk in front of their shops samples of their wares, it did not follow that it was ever the intention that the public sidewalk space should be converted into a source of monthly revenue by obnoxious persons crying out for the purpose of engaging their services and selling their merchandise. See Advertising Nuisance. Waters. Riparian Rights—Private Wharves May be Built to Reach Navigable Portion of Stream. U. S. In Weems Steamboat Co. v. People's Steam boat Co., reported in L. ed. advance sheets Oct. term 1908, p. 661, decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States June 1, the Court, per Mr. Justice Peckham, said:— "The rights of a riparian owner upon a navigable stream in this country are gov erned by the law of the state in which the stream is situated. These rights are subject to the paramount public right of navigation. The riparian proprietors have the right, among others, to build private wharves out so as to reach the navigable waters of the stream. Dutton v. Strong, 1 Black, 23, 17, L. ed. 29; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 699, 27 L. ed. 584, 587, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 445, 36 L. ed. 1018, 1039, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comrs., 158 U. S. 349, 368, 42 L. ed. 497, 504, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 157. The courts of the state of Virginia affirm the same rights of the riparian proprietor. Norfolk City v. Cooke, 27 Gratt. 430, 435; Alexandria & F. R. Co. v. Faunce, 31 Gratt. 761, 765. If the wharf obstructs navigation or the private rights of others, or if it encroaches upon any public landing, the wharf may be abated. Va. Code, 1887, $998. A private wharf on a navigable stream is thus held to be property which cannot be destroyed or its value im paired, and it is property of the exclusive use of which the owner can only be deprived in accordance with established law; and if neces sary that it or any part of it be taken for the public use, due compensation must be made." Wills and Administration. Executor's Per sonal Liability for Claims Which He Has Not Disallowed. R. I. Where the testatrix was indebted to the plaintiff for labor and materials, and the defendant, the executor, was sued for the claim as personally liable for it, in view of his failure to disallow it within the statutory time, the Superior Court of Rhode Island, per Tanner, P. J., expressed the opinion that the plaintiff had already had, by the allow ance of his claim, all that he could obtain by an action at law. Such allowance by the executor amounts to a judgment against him, said the Court. "We know of no way to com pel an executor to pay a claim against an estate except by suit on his bond." (Not yet reported.) See Gifts.
