Legal Idealism not insuperable, is, at least from the standpoint of the individual school, by no means without foundation. Con fessedly the instructor should be a prac tising lawyer of high repute, deserved eminence and general esteem. The very presence of such a man, the knowledge that his highly successful career has resulted from following the moral prin ciples which he announces, is in itself no small argument, in quarters where the information is valuable, against the false ideal that in "smartness" lies the royal road to professional success. Yet it by no means follows that any eminent lawyer is well fitted to teach. He may lack the art of imparting what he knows. He may be wanting in voice, in presence. More than this, while in theory every upright lawyer is qualified to treat of the moral aspect of his chosen profession, this is scarcely borne out in practice. Such a man may discuss intelligently the code of ethics of his bar association, as he might teach a penal code. But to go beyond the intellectual into the spiritual, to furnish young men with generous enthusiasms which shall con tinue to dominate conduct and deter mine careers, demands not only special aptitude but is gained in its highest efficiency only by a constant concentra tion of thought and personal familiarity with the entire field. Effectively to preach a crusade, one needs must be a Peter the Hermit. Were an individual law school fortunate enough to find such a rare combination of qualities avail able to its hand, the separate needs of the institution would still be limited to a few hours a year, and the element of constant association with the work would necessarily be absent. The matter of selecting a suitable instructor is how ever, in reality, a mere detail. Were other difficulties removed this would be easily overcome. There are eminent
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lawyers like, for example, if indulgence be accorded to the statement, Mr. Justice David J. Brewer of the Supreme Court of the United States, amply equipped by natural aptitude and both popular and professional standing for such a work, who might fairly be expected to show a willingness to consecrate them selves to so high a purpose, were the call of the profession sufficiently clear, its support suitably generous. The impediment in the way of gen eral law school instruction, which is at present found insuperable, is lack of money. In any educational institution one of the rarest possessions is a fund the disposal of which is entirely optional. The curriculum of our legal institutions is well established. Under it, suitable professors and instructors in absolutely essential courses exhaust by salaries, usually moderate in amount, the entire available income of the school. This is an arrangement which cannot well be disturbed for the benefit of instruction on ethics just beyond the special work of the law school professor. Money for such purpose must, therefore, be spe cially contributed. If given, the schools would be glad to use it. A concrete illustration of the situation comes from the dean of one of the great law schools of the United States. "I felt," he says, "so keenly the advantage to our students of some competent in struction in legal ethics as to entertain the purpose of inviting a jurist of national reputation to address them on the subject. I decided, however, that the suggestion of an honorarium should properly accompany such an invitation; and that in view of the eminence and probable engagements of the lawyer in question, one hundred dollars would be little enough to present him. No law school funds being available for the pur pose, I applied to the president of the
