576
THE GREEN BAG
possessed the character of stolen property when it had not in fact been acquired by theft."
SALVAGE. (Nature of Service — Salvage or Towage.) U. S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of S. C. — A very interesting case, involving the distinction between a salvage service and mere towage, is that of The Robert S. Besnard. 144 Federal Reporter, 992. It is there declared that if a vessel is in a position which requires towage service only, the mere fact that she had previously suffered injury does not change the nature of the service to one of salvage unless there are some circumstances of peril, im mediate or to be reasonably apprehended, from which the vessel is relieved, or some hazard encoun tered or unusual work done by the relieving vessel. The bark Besnard, on a voyage from Montevideo to New York, in the winter, was struck by a water spout when about 500 miles east of Charleston, losing a part of her masts, and having left only six of her nineteen sails. She was sound in hull, and able with her remaining sails to make five or six knots an hour with favorable winds, but the wind becoming northerly after a day or two, she turned for the port of Charleston. Her master asked two or three passing vessels for a tow, which he did not get, but at no time made any signal of distress. One vessel offered to take off himself and crew, which he refused. He reached the vicinity of the Charleston lightship at night, and anchored, all of the crew going to bed except the usual watch. The following morning a tug went out and towed the bark in. The master of the bark endeavored to make a bargain for the towage, but the master of the tug declined, and the ser vice was accepted, leaving the matter of compen sation open. The master of the tug had received notice the night before from a passing vessel that she had spoken the bark, and that the sea was heavy, but did not go out until the next morning. The wind was no more than fresh, the bark was securely anchored, and was in no unusual peril, and the towage service was not attended with danger, and was no more than required by all vessels entering the port. On these facts the libelant claimed that the service was a salvage, and not a towage. A large number of cases are cited, all based more or less upon a statement made by Dr. Lushington, in The Reward, i W. Rob. 174, where it is said that mere towage ser vice is confined to vessels that have received no injury or damage, and that mere towage reward is payable in those cases only where the vessel receiving the service is in the same condition she would ordinarily be in without having encoun tered any damage or accident. It is pointed out
that this statement is in reality a dictum and that the rule actually applied in the case is not in con flict with that laid down in the present case. Sal vage, it is said, is in the nature of a bounty for extraordinary exertions, the amount of the bounty depending upon the success achieved, the value of the property saved, and the degree of danger from which it was rescued, but that while there are many ingredients, the one essential element is that the property shall be saved from danger either actually impending or reasonably to be apprehended, and that in the absence of any peril it is not salvage, however beneficial and meri torious the service may be. Therefore, it is de clared that as in the present case the bark was not actually in danger at the time the service was rendered, but had, on the contrary, safely passed through the period of danger and distress, an award for salvage should not be made.
TAXATION. (Property Used for Public Pur pose — Bonds Owned by City.) Ky. Ct. of App. — What appears to be a very sensible holding is that delivered by the Court of Appeals of Ken tucky in Board of Councilmen v. Commonwealth, 94 S. W. 648, where it is determined that nonnegotiable bonds acquired by a city as a part of the consideration for the sale of a gas plant and held by the city solely for the purpose of devot ing the income to paying the expenses of lighting the streets, are used for public purposes within a provision of the constitution declaring that pub lic property used for public purposes shall be exempt from taxation and that taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only. Cities being authorized by statute to collect taxes for the purpose of building and maintaining water works and lighting plants, the court regards the maintenance of a public lighting plant as a public necessity, so that money devoted to such main tenance is unquestionably devoted to a public use, as a result of which the bonds held solely for the purpose of aiding the city in maintaining its lighting plant should themselves be regarded as used for a public purpose.
WAREHOUSEMEN. (Stock Yards — Regula tion of Rates.) Kans. Sup. Ct. — The growing tendency to assert that the public has some rights which even corporations are bound to respect is reflected in Ratcliff v. Wichita Union Stock Yards Co.. 86 Pacific Reporter, 150, where it is held that the carrying on of stock yards at a commercial center, with which yards all the railroads enter
