THE GREEN BAG in connection with the sale of one hotel to the other, and as an incident thereto, it would have been upheld and it is difficult to see what objec tionable feature this would have removed from the arrangement, except to bring it clearly within the facts of previously decided cases.
EXTRADITION. (Liability to Civil Process.) N. J. Sup. Ct. — In Rutledge v. Krauss, 63 Atl. 988, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declares that a person surrendered to that state by the executive of another state under extradition pro ceedings to answer for a crime committed in New Jersey may be held, tried, convicted, and sen tenced there for another and distinct offense from that for which he was returned, and that a civil suit may likewise be instituted against such per son before his discharge or immediately after it, and that he is not entitled to a reasonable time after his discharge to permit him to return to the state from whence he came before such suit may be instituted. The rule thus stated in so far as it applies to prosecutions for other criminal offenses than the one for which the person was extradited is that which generally obtains in most of the states, in which respect there is a difference be tween interstate and international extradition. In so far as the rule is extended so as to make the person to be extradited liable to civil action, the rule is supported by fewer authorities. Counsel argued that inasmuch as a person coming from another state voluntarily as a witness or party to a suit was free from arrest and service of process in a civil action, the same rule should be applied to the case of persons extradited, but the court asserts that the rule applicable to prosecutions for other crimes is also applicable to civil suits, and in support of its holding cites People v. Cross, 135 N. Y. 536, 32 N. E. 246, 31 Am. St. Rep. 850; Com. v. Wright, 158 Mass. 150, 33 N. E. 82, 19 L. R. A. 206, 35 Am. St. Rep. 475; /« re Miles, 52 Vt. 609; State ex ret. Brown v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, igN.W. 429, 50 Am. Rep. 388; Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645; Williams v. Weber, i Colo. App. 191, 28 Pac. 21. INFANTS. (Contracts — False Representa tions as to Age — Estoppel.) Miss. Sup. Ct. — The case of Commander v. Brazil. 41 So. 497, adds another authority to those which go practically to the extent of holding an infant bound by his contracts under certain circumstances. The de fendant in this case, while an infant, but after his stature and appearance indicated that he had reached years of maturity, purchased a livery business, and to secure a portion of the purchase
price executed deeds of trust covering the prop erty, and also a tract of land. During the trans action he stated several times, in answer to direct questions, that he was twenty-one years of age. and the seller executed the contract believing and relying on those statements. In dealing with the question whether defendant was entitled to avoid the contract and prevent the enforcement of the deeds of trust the court says that practically all the authorities recognize the right of the matter, inasmuch as while holding that a minor cannot be sued on his contract, they never theless hold that he is liable for his tort, and can be sued for damages for his false representations. Other authorities lay down the rule that he may not be sued at law but may be sued in equity. The court then suggests that if a minor is to be made liable for his fraud and his property taken to com pensate in damages a person who has suffered by the minor's deceit, it is difficult to understand how it can be made any easier on the minor for this to be done through an action of tort instead of on his contract, if the same results follow. And so, limiting its holding somewhat closely to the facts of the case, the court declares that when a minor has reached the stage of maturity, which indicates that he is of full age, and enters into a contract falsely representing himself to be of age, accepting the benefits of the contract, he will be estopped to deny that he is not of age when the obligation of the contract is sought to be inforced against him. INJUNCTION. (Restraining Prosecution for Crime.) Kans. Sup. Ct. — Levy v. Kansas City, 86 Pacific Reporter, 149, is a case almost on a par with the celebrated old English suit for an accounting between highwaymen. The city of Kansas City, Kansas, in violation of law, enacted an ordinance providing for the granting of licenses to gamblers to violate the law in certain portions of the city. Plaintiff, Levy, procured such a license and opened up a place of business within the prohibited district, for which he was prosecuted and fined. He then filed a petition alleging that the city intended to, and would if not restrained, arrest him again if he opened up his place of busi ness, and asked for an injunction restraining the city from again interfering with him or his busi ness. On default of the city a temporary injunc tion was granted, which on the hearing was dis solved, because the gambling house was within the prohibited limits. In considering the case on plaintiff's writ of error the court says: " This is probably the first instance in the history of the state that a professional criminal, confessing to a daily violation of the law, has had the effron
