Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 18.pdf/565

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530

THE GREEN BAG

561, 23 Am. St. Rep. 377; Stephenson v. Duncan, 73 Wis. 404, 41 N. W. 337, 9 Am. St. Rep. 806; Corcoran v. Milwaukee Gaslight Co., 81 Wis. 191, 51 N. W. 358; Ferriss v. Berlin Machine Works, 90 Wis. 541 63, N. W. 234. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Injuries by Mob — Notice to Mayor). Wis. — A statute of Wisconsin', giving a right of action against the city for personal injuries caused by a mob, but providing that no person shall be entitled to re cover for injuries caused by his negligence, nor unless he shall have immediately notified the mayor of the city after being apprised of any threat to injure him by any mob, is construed in Long v. City. of Neenah, 107 N. W. 10, and it is declared that notice given to the mayor of the city by an employer of the person injured, did not inure to the benefit of the employee. In support of this holding the court cites Loomis v. Board of Supervisors, 6 Lans. 269, where it was held in New York, under a practically similar statute, that where the property destroyed by a mob belonged to several tenants in common, such tenants as had knowledge of the threats before the injury but failed to notify the sheriff, could not recover, but such of the tenants as had no personal knowledge were entitled to recover. The case, however, leans strongly in the direction of a liberal construction of the statutes of the class in question as being remedial in their nature. (See also County of Allegheny v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397-) It is to be noted, that although the court held that a notice given by the employer did not inure to the benefit of the employee, it nevertheless held that the fact that the calling of the plaintiff " a scab," the threatening to " get him and to knock his block off," and the knocking down of one of his companions within a week of the injury complained of, by persons seemingly identified with the same strike, though not identified as the same persons inflicting the injuries sued on, did not make it necessary for the plaintiff to notify the mayor in order that a recovery might be had, the particular attack being unforeseen and unexpected. A. A. B. TELEGRAPHS (Refusal to Send Message — Damages — Mental Anguish). Tex. — A some what novel holding on the question of mental anguish comes from Texas, the original domicile and birthplace of the mental anguish doctrine. The action was against a telegraph company for refusal to transmit a message which was addressed to plaintiff by his wife, and announced that a daughter of the parties was dead and requested plaintiff to come home to attend the funeral.

The message was held to have been for the benefit of both parties, so that in the action by plaintiff the mental anguish of the wife arising from the absence of the plaintiff from the funeral in con sequence of the refusal to transmit the message was an element of damage. It is also held in this case that the telegraph company was guilty of a breach of its duty to the public in refusing to receive and transmit the message, and that it was not excusable because the point to which the message was addressed was on a connecting line, which it feared might not be diligent in orwarding the message. Western Union Tele graph Company v. Simmons, 93 S. W. 686. THEATERS (Tickets of Admission — Re sale). Cal. — A case which in a general way concerns the same subject, but is in no way in conflict with a New York case noted in this issue, is that of Ex parte Quarg, 84 Pac. 766. The present case concerns the validity of a California statute prohibiting any person from selling tickets to theaters or any places of amusement for a price higher than that originally charged by the management of such amusement. Under Cali fornia Statutes 1893, p. 220, c. 125, a ticket of admission to a public place of amusement is made an irrevocable license to the purchaser to occupy a place in such place of amusement during the performance, and tinder this statute it is held that the ticket represents a right of property, and is in itself a species of property, and there fore transferable in the absence of stipulations in the contract. Therefore it is held that the statute which prohibits the sale of the ticket at increased price is void as infringing the property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and that its enactment is not a valid exercise of the police power, as it prohibits an act which is innocent in character and which has no tendency to affect, injure, or endanger the public health, morals, and safety. TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES (Unfair Competition). Mass. — An interesting question conccrnirig trade marks and xmfair competition is decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in George G. Fox Com pany v. Glynn, 76 N. E. 89. Complainants manu factured a peculiar variety of bread containing milk and malt, and used the word " Creamalt" as a trade name, and manufactured loaves of a peculiar shape and size having a glazed and "crackled " surface, caused by the introduction of steam into the oven during the process of bak ing. Each loaf further bore a distinctive label printed in blue ink. After a large demand for this bread had been created, defendants began