EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT are concerned, if we understand his expression ' principle of law ' to include such elementary considerations as justice, common sense, and public convenience. These are the ultimate principles of case law." The author believes that the only reason why a common sense or reasonable view of the circumstances of a case would be considered a rather dubious ground of judicial decision, by most lawyers, is " because the accumulation of precedents, direct or indirect, has become so great and the original foundations of case law are buried so deep beneath the super incumbent masses, that such lawyers have lost sight of them." He considers the matter under the following heads: — "i. Justice, humanity, and other moral obligations as a primary source of case law. "2. Common sense, and the reason of the thing, as a primary source of case law. "3. Public convenience and other practical considerations as a primary source of case law." JURISPRUDENCE. In the August Law Magazine and Review (V. xxxi, p. 434) Rankine Wilson continues his philosophical discxission of " Responsibility in the Law." JURISPRUDENCE. "Law and Govern ment," by W. Harrison Moore, Common wealth Law Review (V. iii, p. 205). JURISPRUDENCE. " A historical sketch of the growth of Mohammedan Jurisprudence," by Abdur Rahim, Calcutta Law Journal (V. iii, p. 107 H.). LITERATURE. "The First Breach of Promise Case in the United States," by Lee M. Friedman, Albany Law Journal (V. Ixviii, PPRACTICE. " Finality of the Award — and of the Decree passed upon the Award," by Durga Charan Banerjee, Allahabad Law Jour nal (V. iii, p. 179). PRACTICE. " Service of Answer by Mail," by John D. Lindsay, Bench and Bar (V. vi, p. it).
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PRACTICE. " The New Act Concerning Demurrers to Evidence," by S. S. P. Patteson, Virginia Law Register (V. xii, p. 275). PROPERTY. "The Torrens System," by Howell Griswold, Jr., American Lawyer (V. xiv, p. 311). PROPERTY. "When Land is Sold for Delinquent Taxes, and Purchaser Fails to have Deed Executed, Within the Statutory Period, What is the Condition of the Title," by J. F. Bouchelle, Virginia Law Register (V. xii, PPROPERTY (Future Interests). Albert M. Kales discusses a theory suggested in previous articles in the Review, by Edward Jenks, in an article entitled, " Future Interests in Land," the first installment of which appears in the July Law Quarterly Review (V. xxii. p. 250). Professor Jenks had suggested putting future interests into two classes to be described as those obtained by " Succession " and those by " Interruption, " on the ground that'these are more descriptive of the real distinctions than the present classifications. Mr. Kales then considers: —• "How far were future interests by way of succession valid at common law, and how far were future interests by way of interruption invalid under the same system. How far are both sorts of future interests valid under conveyances by use or devise? How far was the fact that a future interest took effect by way of succession or interruption an essential element in determining its validity or invalidity?" And states the following as his conclusion to the first part of the discussion: "The principal objection to the usual classification of future interests is that it is not undertaken enough from the point of view of their validity, and that so far as it is, the discussion is a catalogue of cases, which have certain conventional or historical names that have to be explained. The endeavor here has been to meet these objections by attempt ing to describe mutually exclusive classes of future interests in terms of the characteristics which furnish the reason for their being held valid or invalid by the common law. It is
