TWO RECENT CASES ON INTERSTATE MARITAL RELATIONS that by the law of Ohio it was clear that the decree operated to change her status and there was no showing that it did not so operate by Canadian law. This decision seems unsustainable. The result of it is to allow New York to determine the status not only of persons at the time domiciled therein but of persons who were formerly and again later became so domiciled and to determine that status in direct contradiction to the law that governed them at the time of the act affecting their status. Again suppose that Mr. Haddock after the Connecticut decree had married a sec ond wife in Connecticut, had had children born there and then had later with his second wife and children returned to New York. What would have been their status? Would New York be compelled to recognize them as a lawful wife and legitimate chil dren? If so, but if at the same time New York need give no credit to the Connecticut decree, the second Mrs. Haddock and her children would be the lawful wife and chil dren of a man who was still the undivorced husband of the first Mrs. Haddock. Or the New York courts might take the position of recognizing the Connecticut decree to the extent of saying that Mr. Haddock was no longer the husband of the first Mrs. Had dock though she still remained his wife. Or finally may New York say that the whole foundation upon which the claim of the second Mrs. Haddock rests is the Connecti cut decree, that that is worthless, that con sequently she is neither a lawful wife nor the children legitimate children? If this last be possible it would seem that not only may Connecticut not decree the status of one of its own citizens who has married a New York citizen but it may not effectually determine the status of persons who have been born and brought up in its confines. These are but a few of the problems sug gested by the decision; at the same time it must be remembered that the only point necessarily involved in the case is that if a state refuses to recognize a decree under
353
the circumstances of this case its refusal so to do is not a violation of its constitu tional obligations. On the other hand, if it is the law of a state, as it would seem to be of most of the states, that a decree so pro nounced is effective to alter the status of one of its own citizens there is nothing in this decision to change that common law rule. In connection with the last contingency above discussed, a recent English case on a similar question is worth noting. That is the case of Armitage v. Attorney General, referred to at length in the May number of the GREEN BAG, reported in full in 22 Times Law Reports 306 (1906). The facts in that case are these. A, a domiciled English woman married in England G, who was domiciled in New York but temporarily so journing in England, where they continued to live after their marriage but apparently not as their domicile. Later they separated, A went to Dakota, acquired a domicile, brought divorce proceedings in which G ap peared and obtained a divorce for deser tion. Seven months later, while in Colorado, she married H, an Englishman by birth and domicile, and returned with him to England, where they lived as man and wife. Later, the validity of the Colorado marriage being incidently raised in proceedings by G, A's first husband, H filed a bill to have estab lished the validity of his marriage with A and the legitimacy of his children. The court found for the petitioner as to both points. It rested its conclusion on the ground that as New York, the domicile of G at the time of the Dakota divorce, would have recognized it as divorcing him, be cause of his appearance, the English court would do no less, though it remarked in the course of its decision that "such im porting of jurisdiction to a court was abso lutely ludicrous in English law and would be of no effect whatever, unless the court had jurisdiction founded on domicile." Certain difficulties of principles that arise in the light of the Haddock decision in at
