NOTES OF RECENT CASES Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347, wherein it is held that a clause in an accident insurance policy, exempting the company from liability where the insured met his death from inhaling gas, did not excuse payment where death was due to gas breathed into the lungs in an unconscious and involuntary manner. The policy in the pres ent case provided that the insurance should not cover death resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any gas or vapor. This alter ation in language is regarded by the court as not sufficient to withdraw the policy from the opera tion of the rule laid down in the cases cited, and it is held that the company is not exempted from liability for death caused by the accidental inhala tion of gas. In construing the exceptions in an insurance policy, there are two familiar rules. One is that in case of ambiguity, a policy of insurance, being composed by the underwriter, is to be construed in favor of the promisee; and the other is, that in order to achieve the general purpose of the con tract, any policy of insurance, and especially an accident policy, is to be understood, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, to cover all losses that are unintentional. It follows that it is com paratively easy to exclude losses when the promisee intended to bring to pass the effect, and that it is difficult to exclude losses when the promisee did not intend to bring to pass the effect but simply to bring to pass the cause, and that it is still more difficult to exclude losses when the promisee did not intend to bring to pass either cause or effect. In Paul vs. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472 (1889), the life unintentionally and unconsciously inhaled illuminating gas while he was asleep; and, under an accident policy which provided that it should not extend " to any death or liability which may have been caused ... by hernia, bodily infirmities, . . . nor by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous substance, or inhaling of gas, or by any surgical operation, or medical treat ment," it was held that the death in question was not insured against, because, as Gray, J., said in the opinion of the court: " In expressing its intention not to be liable for death from inhaling of gas, the company can only be understood to mean a volun tary and intelligent act by the insured, and not an involuntary and unconscious act. Read in that sense and in the light of the context, these words must be interpreted as having reference to med ical or surgical treatments, . . . or to a suicidal purpose To inhale gas requires an act of volition on the person's part before the danger is incurred." Against this doctrine a vigorous pro test was made in Richardson & Travelers' Ins. Co., 46 Fed. 843 (C. C., N. D., Ill., 1891); but the doctrine has prevailed. In Menneiley vs. Employers' Liability Co., 148 H.-Y. 596 (1896), there was death by asphyxiation in substantially the circumstances of the Paul case;
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and, under an accident policy which provided that it did not insure " against death or disablements arising from anything accidentally taken, adminis tered, or inhaled, contact of poisonous substances, inhaling gas, or any surgical operation or exhaus tion resulting thereon," it was held that there could be no recovery, notwithstanding the new phrase, "anything accidentally taken, administered, or inhaled," or, as Martin, J., in the court, said: "The manifest purpose of the provision is to exempt the insurer from liability where the insured has vol untarily and consciously, but accidentally, taken or inhaled, or something has been voluntarily admin istered. . . . That is made more apparent by the portion of the provision which relates to something ' administered,' as it cannot be reasonably construed as referring to a thing involuntarily and uncon sciously administered." In other words, even the clauses as to anything inhaled " accidentally " does not relieve the underwriter unless the life — though not choosing the effect — chose the cause. This is also the doctrine of Fidelity and Casualty Co. vs. Waterman, 161 Ill., 632 (1896), and Fidelity and Casualty Co. vs. Lowenstein, 36 C. C. A. 29 (Eight Circuit, 1899). , It should be noticed that in the policies quoted the word used was " inhaled " and that there was a context, which, to say the least, failed to fasten upon that word the meaning demanded by the underwriter. This new Illinois case of Travelers' Ins. Co. vs. Ayers, goes further. Here the circum stances of death were the same as in the other cases stated; but the policy had different language, for it excepted death " resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, . . . from any gas or vapor"; but it was held that even this language, — which avoids the word " inhaling," does not protect the underwriter. It is to be regretted that the court, though informed of the distinction, did not explain the reasons for extending the doctrine to this language. If the decision is to be upheld, the reason is to be found, it would seem, not in ambiguity of the clause taken by itself, but rather in a theory that, although this one clause is unam biguous, something more emphatic is requisite hi order to overthrow the accident policy's general purpose of insuring against accidents. Eugene Wambaugh. INSURANCE. (Beneficial Associations. — In crease of Rates.) Mo. Ct. App. — Three cases in volving the same question, neither of which has as yet reached the court of last resort, present for decision the question of the validity of the changes recently made by several well-known mutual ben efit associations in their rates of assessment. The cases are Pearson v. Knight Templars' & Masons' Life Indemnity Ins. Co., Wright v. Knights of Maccabees, and Mock v. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum. The opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals in the first mentioned case is re ported in 89 Southwestern Reporter, 555. The
