his competency); but the court must be satis fied from the circumstances that the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try the issue impartially. (Lesser, History of the Jury System, note p. 181.) But Mr. Les ser justly observes that "in New York the description of the citizen juror is that he should be "of fair character, of approved in tegrity, of sound judgment, and well in formed." But everything depends on the ad ministration of the law; if "the good moral character is as laxly interpreted as the same phrase practically is in the naturalization pro ceedings, it affords but little guaranty." (Lesser, History of the Jury System, p. 182.) Undoubtedly, a just but rigid rule of interpretation is required in order to make these terms of qualification of any practical value in the administration of justice. It is but a slight digression from what has already been said to the case of Jefferson Davis, who was held a prisoner for so many months, charged with treason against the general government. What citizen had not formed or expressed an opinion as to his guilt or innocence? And how was it possi ble to give him a constitutional trial, if this was so? Members of Congress recognized this condition of affairs, and they began at once to propose legislation which should not exclude persons from the jury box by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the statements made in the public jour nals, or upon the common history of the times. It was this condition of matters, while legislation was pending in the Con gress, that induced a member of the Su preme Court of the United States to indite the following note to a United States sena tor, the manuscript of which is in the writer's possession: "I think that experience has shown the necessity of a modification of the rule in all criminal cases, or quasi-criminal (cases), ana
that your law should embrace this general principle without limiting it to cases of riot, or having any relation to the rebellion. "Placed on a foundation of principle, it would then be more satisfactory as well as more easily justified by reason. "The immediate publication of the facts by the newspapers in all murder cases, by which means every intelligent man within the vicinage must form an opinion, has rendered the old rule productive of more injury than benefit in the administration of justice. It is now often impossible to get juries at all in cases where great crimes are in question. "If Congress, then, should take the lead in the modification of a general rule, applying that modification to all cases in the Federal courts, it would be but a proper exercise of its preeminence as a legislative body, while an attempt to provide a rule for existing cases not likely to arise hereafter, would be liable to comment not altogether unjust. "Yours truly, "SAM. F. MILLER. "I fully concur with Mr. Justice Miller. •-S J FIELD. "P. S.—Is it necessary to make your bill apply to grand juries?" Of course, the foregoing views of mem bers of the Supreme Court are in the nature of the history of the times to which they re late. But they seem so opportune in con nection with this discussion of the qualifica tion of jurors, and establish the main con tention, that the formation of an opinion of any case, in and of itself, is not, and ought not to be, aYiy objection to the competency of an individual to serve as a juror, that we could not resist the opportunity to submit them. It is, however, beyond the province of this paper to trace the history of the leg islation which has been barely referred to in the above note.
