nothing, they could then with reason claim a preference in the payment of the amounts due them. They would then stand in a posi tion analogous to that of judgment credi tors. ... If we were to admit that technically the law would permit of the decision rendered in the present case, wç should still be forced to insist that the equitable rights of the parties demanded a different decision. The Court evidently took the view that it was a court of law only and not a court of equity as well. This is most unfortunate and will be espec ially so if it is followed as a precedent for future .decisions. For, if this is not to be a court of equity as well as of common law jurisdiction, what provision is left for equitv jurisdiction in the field of international jus tice? If there is in municipal law need for a "correction of that wherein the law by reason of its universality is inadequate," there is certainly an equal, if not greater, need for it in international law. Had the equities of the case been considered, the Court would not have held that the protocol of February isth executed under duress was a sufficient basis upon which to rest a de cision, and particularly as one of the condi tions upon which the case was submitted to the Court was that said protocol should not be considered binding. That such is the fact appears from an impartial study of the negotiations. Viewing the case as a whole, this much is certain : That if adherence to the rules of in ternational lav necessitated the decision ren dered in this case, then there is an impera tive need of a conference of the nations to amend the law upon this point. For it is in consistent and irrational to hold, as civilized nations do, that peace is a thing to be fos tered and at the same time enforce a rule in a peace court which encourages a resort to war. '•FOREIGN Investments in Time of War" are discussed by Robert Agar Chadwick, in The Quarterly Lava Review for April. He savs:
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Whatever dangers war may have in store for the foreign investor, there is now little fear of his property being confiscated by the enemy State. Within recent years the old right of confiscation has only once been ex ercised, namely, by the Confederate, States in 1861. Not only was the act condemned in Europe and in America, but sales under it have been held void. If the right stiM exist, "it may well be considered as a naked and impolitic right, condemned by the enlight ened conscience and judgment of modern times." Clearly, if the State do not confiscate the debenture loans and shares it would be gross ly unjust to allow private individuals to do so. The law has never permitted this, and indeed it has been laid down in the United States that "war does not confiscate debts or property for the benefit of debtors or agents, but only suspends the right of ac tion." The two most important questions for a debenture-holder are:— (1) Will he be in danger of losing his prin cipal owing to the Statute of Limita tions running during hostilities? (2) Will he be able on the restoration of peace to sue for arrears of interest ac crued on the debenture during hostili ties? With regard to the first question the Su preme Court of the United States in Hanger v. Abbott, after expressly considering the effect of the English statute 21 Jac. I. c. 16 and all the cases bearing upon the subject, held that "Peace restores the right and the remedy, and as that cannot be if the limitation con tinues to run during the period the creditor is rendered incapable to sue, it necessarily follows that the operation of the statute is also suspended during the same period." This principle has been followed in other American cases, but according to the English text-books it would appear that a different rule prevails in this country. ... In spite of the text-books it is conceived that should the question really come before an English
