Notes of Recent Cases. a personal liability claimed to have arisen be cause they had incurred for the city a bonded debt in excess of the constitutional limitation, which by reason of the transfer of the bonds to innocent holders the city was precluded from contesting. The proposition is said by the Court to be unique and in discussing it no authorities are cited. In the opinion of the Court the defendants are not liable. The following quotations will illustrate the Court's views: "Counsel for appellant does not cite any case holding that the mayor and the respective members of the council of a city may be held personally liable in dam ages because that municipal indebtedness in excess of the constitutional limit has been contracted or permitted. We know of no such case, and we cannot say that there is anything in reason or the spirit of our sys tem of government that dictates the promul gation of any such rule at our hands. While a violation of the Constitution in the respect in question is to be condemned, and the courts should interfere to prevent such vio lation whenever called upon so to do, yet we are not prepared to adopt the suggestion that an action for damages may be resorted to, as affording a proper means of redress, where a violation has been accomplished." . . . "It has always been the law that a public officer who acts either in a judicial /of legislative capacity cannot be held to respond in damages on account of any act done by him in his official capacity. His act may be void, as in excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise without authority of law, and he may be subject to impeachment and re moval from office for corrupt practices, but he cannot be mulcted in damages."
NURSE. (VALUE OF SERVICES—OPINION EVIDENCE —TESTIMONY OF PHYSICIAN.) TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS.
In Cameron Mill & Elevator Co. v. Ander son, 78 Southwestern Reporter, 971, it is held that a physician who is not a nurse, and who has never employed one, and1 who has no personal knowledge as to the compen sation of professional nurses in the city be
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yond what a few of them told him, is not qualified to testify as to their reasonable and customary compensation. The court says, that while hearsay may form the basis of a receivable opinion as to value, the inquiries or statements relied upon should be of such extent and character as will afford a fair in ference that the witness had knowledge of the subject. PARDON. (VALIDITY— SUFFICIENCY OF FILING— GOVERNOR'S SIGNATURE— PRACTICE.) MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT.
In Spafford î'. Benzie Circuit Judge, 98 Northwestern Reporter 741, various ques tions of practice connected with the pardon ing of a convicted person are discussed. It is held that the fact that a pardon is not ad dressed to the court having custody of the prisoner, and does not state the date of his conviction, and erroneously recites that he has been sentenced, do not affect its valid ity, and that the fact that a pardon was de livered directly to the prisoner concerned is immaterial. A formal motion to the court to discharge the prisoner because he has been pardoned is said to be the proper method of bringing the pardon to the court's attention. Where the original pardon is de livered to the court having custody of the prisoner several days before the hearing of such a motion, there is a sufficient filing of the pardon, though no copy was filed with the clerk until after the motion was made. People v. Marsh, 125 Mich. 410, 84 N. W. 472, 51 L. R. A. 461, 84 Am. Rep. 584, is cited as conclusive of the governor's power to pardon before sentence. Finally, it is held that the fact that only the initials of the governor's Christian names are used in his signature to the pardon, which is duly at tested by the Secretary of State and is other wise regular in form and substance, does not affect the pardon's validity. PUBLIC BUILDINGS. (UNAUTHORIZED USE — RIGHT то COMPLAIN.) KANSAS SUPREME COURT.
In Amusement Syndicate Co. v. City of
