profession, in matters of private law, is, I fear, still that of Richard De Bury and of Napoleon. We are charged with a disposi tion to protract litigation and to twist "the meaning of statutes to the purpose of our own machinations:" with living upon the quarrels of others and even stirring up dis putes to promote our own interests. In short, we are deemed the parasites of society, living upon values but creating none. Is this a correct view? If it were, we ought to find those nations the happiest, the most peaceful and orderly, the richest and the most pro gressive, in which the legal parasites are the fewest. But the actual state of things is just the opposite of this. Giina has no lawyers. In Russia the proportion of lawyers to popu lation is one to thirty-one thousand. In Germany, one to eighty-seven hundred; in France, one to forty-one hundred; in Eng land, one to eleven hundred; in the United States, one to seven hundred. These statis tics would tend to show that the legal pro fession is a blessing rather than an evil; that its members are not parasites of society, but, on the other hand, if not direct creators of values, that they are the protectors of those engaged in production. Let us examine the function of the lawyer with a view of discovering whether this in terpretation of the statistics is correct. In 1670, William Penn and his companion. Mead, were tried at the Old Bailey, London, for an unlawful assembly. The officers of the crown used every possible effort to secure a conviction, and the judge openly threatened rhe jurors with punishment, if they dared to bring in a verdict of acquittal. Notwith standing all this pressure, Penn and Mead were acquitted. Thereupon, the jury were fined by the judge for bringing in a verdict which he declared was against the evidence. One of the jurors, named Bushel, refused to pay the fine, was committed to prison, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Upon the return of this writ, a question of the highest
importance was presented by the counsel for Bushel. For more than four centuries, Magna Charta had affirmed that no freeman should be taken or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed or banished, unless by the lawful judgment of his peers. But, if the judge could fine the jury for bringing in a verdict, which was contrary to his notion of the evi dence, trial by jury was a mere mockery. Not by his peers, not by an impartial jury of the vicinage, but by a judge appointed by the crown and removable at pleasure, was the guilt or innocence of a person to be de cided. A matter of vital importance to the liberty of the citizen, it will be seen, was in volved in this law suit of Bushel. Keenly was it appreciated and nobly was it argued by his counsel. The fine and the imprison ment were declared illegal, and "from that time forth the invaluable doctrine, that a jury in the discharge of their duty are re sponsible only to God and their consciences, has never been shaken or impeached." Not for Bushel only was the victory won by his lawyers, but for every juryman, and for every person accused of crime, wherever English common law obtains. So Hampden's refusal to pay the twenty shillings of ship money and his defence of the suit brought for its colleation, were not prompted solely by selfish considerations. He and his counsel were contending for a great principle. If the King had lawful au thority to levy a tax of twenty shillings on John Hampden. then all private property in England was held subject to the monarch's will. Not whether the individual Hampden should pay a petty tax, but whether any property holder in the realm could deem his ownership secure, was the issue. Royal judges obeyed their master's commands and condemned Hampden to pay. Appeal was taken to the nation. Monarch and servile judges were overthrown. The rule of law contended for by Hampden was reestab lished, and has ever since remained a car
