perintp.nded the construction of the house, receiving compensation therefor. So far the law protected him, but beyond that he had no further rights in his work. The cases of Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N. Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480; Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U. S. 617, 657, 9 Sup. Ct. 177, 32 L. Ed. 547; Jewelers' Mer. Agency v. Jewelers' Pub. Co., 155 N. Y. 241, 251, 49 New England Reporter 872, 41 L. R. A. 846, 63 Am. St. Rep. 666, are cited in support of this view. The court also holds that where an architect prepares plans for a client for a certain compensation they be long after publication, to Hie client and not to the architect. AUTOMOBILES. (CHAFFEUR'S TEMPORARY AB SENCE—DUTY то FASTEN MACHINE.) NEW YORK SUPREME COURT.
In Berman v. Schnitz, 84 New York Sup plement 22, the plaintiff sued for injuries to his horse and wagon from a collision wdth an automobile which was left unattended while the operator went into a build ing to deliver goods, and which had been started by some small boys playing near by. The court, in reversing a judg ment for plaintiff, says that the law did not impose on the defendant the duty to make the starting of the machine impossible; that throwing off the current, putting on the brake, and throwing off the switch, so that the machine could not start of itself, were sufficient precautions, and it was not the operator's duty to chain the machine to a post, or in some way fasten it so that it would be impossible for it to be started by a third person. The act of the small boys was the proximate cause of the trouble. BLACKLISTING. (LEGALITY—RIGHT OF MASTER то DISCHARGE SERVANT — CONSPIRACY то DE STROY LABOR UNION.) UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE KASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.
The case of Boyer v. The Western Union Telegraph Co., 124 Federal Reporter 246, is a noteworthy addition to the law regulating the relations of capital and labor. The suit
was by members of a Telegraphers' Union, to prevent the disruption of that organization by the carrying out of the defendant's pur pose to discharge its members from employ ment. The court holds that in the absence of a contract a master may discharge his servant without notice whenever he pleases, and that in consequence of this right there can be no such thing as an unlawful conspi racy to destroy a labor union by discharging its members or refusing to employ them. The remedy for discharge from employment in violation of a contract is declared to be at law, and not in equity. And then comes the most important hold ing in the case; that an employer having discharged employés belonging to a labor union has the right to keep a book contain ing their names and showing the reason of their discharge, and to invite inspection thereof by other employers, even though the latter therefore refuse to hire the discharged employés. The court says: "Suppose a man should file a bill alleging that he be longed to the Honorable and Ancient Order of Freemasons, or to the Presbyterian Church, or to the Grand Army of the Re public; that his employer had discharged him solely on that account; that he had discharged others of his employés, and in tended to discharge all of them, for the same reason; that he kept a book which contained all the names of such discharged persons, and set opposite the name of each discharged person the fact that he had been discharged solely on the ground that he belonged to such organization; and that he had given such information to others, who refused to employ such persons on that account. Is it possible a court of equity could grant relief? If so, pray, on what ground? And yet that is a perfectly parallel case to this as made by the bill." The court cites in support of this decision: Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. C. Co., 49 Am. Rep. 666; Dinah Worthington et al. v. James Waring et al., 157 Mass. 421, 32 New England Reporter 744, 20 L. R. A. 342, 34 Am. St. Rep. 294; Hundley v. Louisville &
