cision should be rendered by the Supreme Court the Democracy of Illinois would be in a hopeless minority. He set to work with his usual sagacity to meet the emergency. Upon reading the record sent up by the lower court, he found that it was defective—that it contained errors, and that it lacked many things which had been carelessly omitted. When the Supreme Court met, and the judges had unrolled their opinions, prepara tory to pronouncing judgment in the case of Spraggins v. Houghton, Douglas addressed the court, stating that the case was one of great importance, important to the persons immediately involved in it, but of still greater importance to thousands of other persons in the State, as it was a case involving the polit ical status of a very large portion of the peo ple of Illinois. It was, therefore, highly im portant that the decision should be final, whichever way it might be. He then went on to say that, upon a careful examination of the record in the case since it had been argued, he had discovered that it was fatally defective, so much so that no judgment could be rendered on it, and he was unwilling to accept a judgment in a matter of such grave importance to the public when that judg ment, in consequence of defects in the record, would be of no force or effect; he, therefore, moved that the case be dismissed. The motion was resisted, and was set down for argument. It was subsequently argued, and without any decision on the motion the whole case was continued until the next win ter term. In the meantime the Presidential election took place in November, and the Democratic party retained its ascendancy in Illinois. The legal principle, asserted by Mr. Douglas in this famous case, and then sup posed to be unsound, is now the well-estab lished doctrine of all parties in all the States. During the session of the Illinois Legis lature, in 1840-41, the judiciary of the State was reorganized; the existing circuit courts were abolished, and the judges of the Su
preme Court increased to nine. Under this act, the Legislature, in joint convention, on the fifteenth of February, 1841, elected five additional judges, of whom Stephen A. Douglas was one. It was only seven years since he arrived in the State, a poor stranger, without friends or books—seven years since he was admitted to practise law by four of the judges who were to be his colleagues on the bench. In less than seven years, by his ability, energy, industry and attention to business, he had risen to a commanding posi tion at the bar of Illinois, and this, too, be fore he had completed his twenty-eighth year. So rapid and brilliant a rise in the con servative profession of the law is scarcely paralleled in the legal annals of the United States. His circuit was the Fifth District, a district made memorable and annoying on account of the Mormon settlements included in it. The records show that some of the most ex citing scenes of his life were spent in adjudi cating the troubles growing out of the tribu lations of the people in connection with the Mormon leaders. Joe Smith and his deluded followers were accused of every crime com mitted in their neighborhood, from robbing a hen-roost to murder. If a Mormon prisoner escaped conviction, the Gentiles held the court responsible; if a Mormon was con victed, his brethren accused the court of op pression. One case will show how difficult it was to administer justice, under the circum stances; and, also, that Judge Douglas pos sessed something of the bold, decided char acter of Andrew Jackson. Joe Smith was brought before him accused with some of fence. A great crowd of people collected to see the notorious prisoner, and to rejoice at his conviction. They were anxious to get rid of Smith, hoping that, if he were out of the way, the Mormon settlements would be dispersed. As the trial progressed, it was whispered that the evidence was not suffi cient to convict the prisoner, and some per
