them, and graduate the punishment accord ing to its own judgment of their propriety and wisdom. . . . However large the powers conferred upon the government formed by the Constitution, and however numerous its restraints, the right to enforce their own laws by such sanctions as they may deem ap propriate is left, where it was originally, with the States." In Boyd v. Nebraska he denied the juris diction of the court to determine a disputed question concerning the right ro the gover norship of a State. "The national govern ment's powers of interfering with the admin istration of the affairs of the State, and the officers through whom they are conducted, extends only so far as may be necessary to secure to it a republican form of govern ment and protect it against invasion, and also against domestic violence, on the application of its legislature, or of its executive when that body cannot be convened. Except as required for these purposes, it can no more interfere with the qualification and installa tion of the State officers than a foreign gov ernment. And all attempts at interference with them in those respects by the executive, legislative or judicial departments of the general government are, in my judgment, so many invasions upon the reserved rights of the States, and assaults upon their constitu tional autonomy." See, also Barbier v. Con nelly, 113 U. S. 27; Soon Hing v. Crowlev, 113 ib. 703; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 ib. 68: Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. I lûmes, 115 ib. 512. Moreover, Justice Field believed in the strict construction of the powers conceded to the national government. His course with respect to the confiscation acts of iS6r affords a good illustration of his point of view. In the case of Miller v. United States, ii Wall. 268, in which he dissented from the judgment of the court, he did not deny the right of the United States, at its op tion, to treat the inhabitants of the Confeder
ate States engaging in rebellion as public enemies, and to apply to them all the harsh measures justified by the rules of war, or to prosecute them in the ordinary modes of criminal procedure for treason. But the question was, which course had Congress authorized? Legislation founded on the war power was subject to no limitation except the law of nations, while legislation founded on the municipal power of the government and directed against criminals was subject to all the limitations prescribed by the Consti tution for the protection of the citizen against hasty and indiscriminate accusation, and which insure to him when accused a speedy and public trial. Having reached the con clusion that the legislation in question was enacted in the exercise of the municipal power, he held, therefore, that a proceeding in rem for the confiscation of the property of parties charged with certain overt acts of treason could not be constitutionally main tained without the previous conviction of the parties for the offenses alleged. While he was unable to secure the adoption of this view, he succeeded in subsequent cases (Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; Con rad v. Waples, 96 U. S. 279; Burbank v. Con rad, 96 U. S. 291) in rigidly confining the operation of these acts within the letter of the law. On the other hand, in Coleman v. Tennes see, 97 U. S. 500,, and Dow v. Johnson, IOO U. S. 158, he extended the utmost protection to the army in the enemy's country. "The question is," he said in the latter case, "what is the law which governs an army invading an enemy's country? It is not the civil law of the invaded country; it is not the civil law of the conquering country; it is military law—the law of war—and its supremacy for the protection of the officers and soldiers of the army, when in service in the field in the enemy's country, is as essential to the effi ciency of the army as the supremacy of the civil law at home and in time of peace is es
