tions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of the same age, sex and condition. The State may prescribe such regulations for every pursuit and calling of life as will pro mote the public health, secure the good or der and advance the general prosperity society, but when once prescribed, the pur suit or calling must be free to be followed by every citizen who is within the conditions designated, and will conform to the regula tions. This is the fundamental idea upon which our institutions rest, and unless ad hered to in the legislation of the country our government will be a republic only in name. . . . That only is a free government, in the American sense of the term, under which the inalienable right of every citizen to pursue his happiness is unrestrained, except by just, equal and impartial laws." Throughout the discussion of these amend ments—in Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Virginia v. Rives, 100 ib. 315; Ex parte Virginia, 100 ib. 339; Neal v. Dela ware, 103 ib. 370—he protested against what he considered the artificial views of the ma jority of the court. "To afford equality of protection to all persons by its laws," he said in Neal v. Delaware, "does not require the State to permit all persons to participate equally in the administration of those laws, or to hold its offices, or to discharge the trusts of government. Equal protection of the laws of a State is extended to persons within its jurisdiction, within the meaning1 of the amendment, when its courts are open to them on the same terms as to others, with like rules of evidence and modes of proce dure, for the security of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; when they are subjected to no restrictions in the acquisition of property, the enjoyment of personal liberty and the pursuit of happiness, which do not equally affect others; when they are liable to no other nor greater burdens or charges than such as are laid upon others,
and when no different nor greater punish ment is enforced against them for a viola tion of the laws." In Ex parte Virginia he makes plain the fundamental distinction between civil 'and po litical rights: "The amendment secures to all persons their civil rights upon the same terms; but it leaves political rights, or such as arise from the form of government and its administra tion, as they stood previous to its adoption. It has no more reference to them than it has to social rights and duties, which do not rest upon any positive law, though they are more potential in controlling the intercourse of in dividuals. In the consideration of questions growing out of these amendments, much confusion has arisen from a failure to dis tinguish between the civil and the political rights of citizens. Civil rights are absolute and personal. Political rights, on the other hand, are conditioned and dependent upon the discretion of the elective or appointing power, whether that be the people acting through the ballot, or one of the departments of their government. The civil rights of the individual are never to be withheld, and may be always judicially enforced. The political rights which he may enjoy, such as holding office and discharging a public trust, are qual ified because their possession depends upon fitness, to be adjudged by those whom so ciety has clothed with the elective authority. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were designed to secure the civil rights of all persons, of every race, color and condition; but they left to the States to determine to whom the possession of political powers should be entrusted." This great principle of equality, in his opin ion, was not the special privilege of citizens of the United States. Although he had de livered the opinion of the court sustaining the Chinese Exclusion Act, he dented the power of Congress to deport from the coun try persons lawfully domiciled therein, by Its
