but to obey. Yet no statutes have ever i If unmodified by the sovereign power of a nation—for the nation can bind its citizens been framed in form thus conclusive; and if a case is prima facie within the legislative or subjects even although a foreign nation words, still a court will not take the juris may hesitate to accept its interpretation of diction should the law of nations forbid." a principle common to all—such usages and Again: "All statutes are to be construed customs are not only the law, but the source in connection with one another, with the of the law. If Congress has not manifested common law, with the constitution, and with by statute a contrary intent, it is to be pre sumed that the Congress accepts interna the law of nations." As regards the third source—"judicial de tional law as it exists, and confides its in cisions,"—it needs no argument in a country terpretation in a case involving private whose jurisprudence is based upon the ad rights to the judiciary as in the case of any judged case, to convince even the casual other law. The absence of congressional reader of the authority of judgments of legislation me i is that international law is the common »--• of nations untrammeled by courts of competent jurisdiction, never theless, the weighty words of Mr. Chief Jus rule or regulation. (Compare by analogy tice Marshall may well be quoted: "The law the language of Mr. Justice Field in speak of nations is the great source from which ing of absence of congressional action in we derive those rules respecting belligerent matters of interstate commerce. Welton v. and neutral rights which are recognized byMissouri, 1875, 91 U. S. 275.) all civilizet! states throughout Europe and As evidence of "these usages and customs America. This law is in part unwritten, and of civiliz;d nations," the works of jurists and in part conventional. To ascertain that commentators are to be consulted, not in which is unwritten, we resort to the great deed for their speculations—Lord Salis principles of reason and justice; but, as these bury's "prejudices of writers of text-books"— principles will be differently understood by as to what the law should be, but "for trust different nations under different circum worthy 'evidence of what the law really is." stances, we consider them as being, in some To this exposition of this function of the degree, fixed and rendered stable by a se text-book writer whose influence is far-reach ries of judicial decisions. The decisions of ing and permanent as his digest of the law the courts of every country, so far as they of nations is accurate and satisfactory, no are founded upon the law common to every objection can well be taken. The rcsponsw country, will be received, not as authority, prndcntium is unknown to our system of jubut with respect. The decisions of the 1 risprudence and the jus conderc is unclaimed courts of every country show how the law of i and unrecognized unless Lord Coke fare nations, in the given case, is understood in better with posterity than with his contempo that country, and will be considered in raries. The clear, crisp statement of Mr. Justice adopting the rule which is to prevail in this." Gray regarding the weight properly due (Bentzon v. Boyle, 1815, 9 Cranch, 191, 198.) A fourth source consists of the "usages text-books and their authors" does not indeed stand alone; but text-book writers still quote and customs of civilized nations," for if one another as if mere iteration of indi communis error facit jus, it cannot be denied vidual error or the prejudices of the that usages and customs of nations long ac writers of text-books make, in some mys cepted and acted upon and based and bot terious manner, the law of the world. tomed on, "the great principles of reason "Their theories," says Sir James Stephen and justice" are of fundamental importance.
