A Century of Federal Judicature. said that he would not allow even a court of ficer to read a newspaper during the sittings of the court. His apparent indifference to public opinion was probably one of the causes of his unpopularity with the general public. He never noticed newspaper attacks, believing that the daily press, from the na ture oí things can never be the 'field of fame' for judges. Although he was not able to dominate the court as Marshall had done, 'his associates were unanimous in their testimony to the force and influence of 'his great qualities of mind and character in the consultation room. The reports during his twenty-eight years' service, from the last six volumes of Peters to Black, contain only about three hundred opinions by him. His delicate health pre vented him from writing many elaborate opinions; and it is said also that he was kindly disposed to give his associates an opportunity to distinguish themselves in for mulating the conclusions of the court. Taney differed from the majority of his colleagues in less than thirty cases, and seldom without the concurrence of one or more justices. He formulated his dissenting views in only seven cases, three of which were admiralty cases, turning upon questions of fact. His dissent ing opinions in the Wheeling Bridge case, Taylor v. Carryl. State of Massachusetts г'. State of Rhode Island are among his most elaborate efforts. Only one of his judgments on circuit was reversed on appeal (Haney v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 23 How. 287.) His opinions are written in a style which Chief Justice Chase paid the high compli ment of studying as a professed model. Probably his opinions in the Genesee Chief, Luther v. Borden and Ableman r. Booth are the best specimens of his style and method. In considering the value of his labors as a contribution to Federal jurisprudence, it must be conceded that they were especially useful in reforming and perfecting the rules of practice. The practice of the court had be
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come loose and uncertain during the latter part of Marshall's service, and the increasing business of the court demanded its reduction to form and system. This was a subject con genial to Taney's mind, and a large propor tion of his opinions deal with it. Some of his opinions on the larger aspects of this subject, such as Kendall v. United States and State of Rhode Island v. State of Massachusetts, repay careful examination. In general tendency in the construction of Federal powers the court under Taney and the reconstructed bench undoubtedly showed wide divergence from the views of Marshall and his associates. The broad and liberal interpretation of Federal powers which had so long prevailed were now checked. Taney's theory of government differed radically from that of his predecessor, and it was not to be expected that, he would divest himself of his fundamental convictions in the exercise of ju dicial functions. This general tendency was accompanied by a decided lack of uniformity of opinion, and it would seem that the prac tice of seriatim opinions was resumed be cause of this lack of cohesion. It was not until the latter part of Taney's service that the general concurrence of opinion by the chief justice and Justices Nelson and Camp bell exercised something like a dominant in fluence. But it is questionable whether the extent of counteracting influence of Taney and1 his associates has not been overesti mated by popular opinion. We can now see the value of their critical attitude. Their work served, ais Mr. Carson says in his schol arly history of the court, to check excesses, to limit extravagances of doctrine, to awaken and develop new powers, to moderate ten dencies, to introduce contrasts and elements which could be used in after years. After Marshall's death, three important cases of constitutional law upon which there had been a difference of opinion came up for re-argument—Mayor of New York v. Miln, Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, and Charles
