given abundant evidence of his complete mastery of the common law, and he soon showed that his grasp of Scotch and colonial and ecclesiastical law was no less strong. In chancery appeals he did not hesitate to express independent views, but he was naturally overshadowed by the authority of Cairns and Selborne. In common law ap peals he was a recognized autocrat. It was not until the last year or two of Blackburn's service that Watson began to take a promi nent part in English appeals, and the sturdy Bramwell did not become a member of the court until 1882. One may venture to say, by way of comparison, that this was the ablest period of Lord Blackburn's judi cial service. Lord Watson (1880-99) was not only the ablest judge contributed by Scotland to the House of Lords; he was one of the most remarkable judicial characters of his time. In the domain of Scots law, to which his predecessors had mainly confined their at tention, he displayed at the outset his emi nent qualifications for judicial office. But Lord Watson was not content to play a minor part. He proceeded to study English law; and as his confidence in his knowledge increased the modest expression of opinion which he had been wont to give in his earlier cases gave way, shortly before Black burn's retirement, to those masterly expoDalton v. Angus, 6 A. C. 740 (easements); Sewell v. Burdick, 10 A. C. 74 (bill of lading); Pearks v. Moseley, 5 A. C. 714 (bequest); Lyell v. Kennedy, 14 A. C. 448 (real property); Sturla v. Freccia, 5 A. C. 623 (evidence); Speight v. Gaunt, 9 A. C. 1 (trust); Bank of England v. Vagliano (1891), A. C. 107; Duncan v. Wales Bank, 6 A. C. 8 (bill of exchange); Harvey v. Farnie, 8 A, C. 43 (Scotch divorce); Mackonochie v. Penzance, 6 A. C. 424 (ecclesiastical law); Whyte v. Pollock, 7 A. C. 400 (will); Mayor of London v. London Bank, 6. A. C. 393 (attach ment); Mersey Steel Co. v. Naylor, 9 A. C. 434 (con tracts); London, etc., Ry. v. Truman, 11 A. C. 45; Drummond!i. Van Ingen, 12 A. C. 284, Ewing v. Orr-Ewing, 10 A. C. 499; Minors v. Battison, 1 A. C. 428; Sarf v. Jardine, 7 A. C. 345; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 A.C. 1 5; Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 A. C. 504; Broaden v. Met. Ry., 2 A. C. 666; Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty, 7 A. C. 741; Erlanger v. Phosphate Co., 3 A. C 1218; Dublin Ry. Co. v. Slattery. 3 A. C. 11 55; Lyon v. Fishmonger's Co. I A C. 662; Clyde Navigation Co. v. Barclay, 1 A. C. 790; Bradlaugh v. Clarke, 8 A. C. 345; Foakes v. Beer, 9 A. C. 605; Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, 8 Ch. App. 484; Ex parte Watkins, 8 Ch. 520; Cooper v. McDonald, 16 Eq. 258; Avers v. Jenkins, 16 Eq. 275; Freke v. Lord Carbery, 16 Eq. 461.
sitions of English law for which, after the death of Herschell, he was unrivalled by any of his associates. It is only necessary to mention in support of this statement such cases as Smith v.Baker, Allen v. Flood, Clarke v. Carfin Coal Company, Solomon v. Solo mon, Macdonald v. Whitfield, Nordenfelt v. Maxim- Nordenfelt, and Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor. His long and splendid service in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would alone place him in the front rank of modern judges. His opinions in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier and Abdul Messih v. Fassa, on the intricate subject of domicile, to cite only two examples, are as luminous as they are exhaustive. In eccle siastical appeals, also, Presbyterian though he was, he took a prominent part. His knowledge of English case law .was, under the circumstances, extraordinary; yet it can hardly be said to have exceeded his grasp of principle and certainty of judgment. Witness his sensible and suggestive reflec tions in refusing to adhere to a strict ob servance of the old doctrine with respect to restraint of trade: "A series of decisions based upon grounds of public policy, how ever eminent the judges by whom they were delivered, cannot possess the same binding authority as decisions which deal with and formulate principles which are purely legal. The course of policy pursued by any country in relation to and for promoting the inter ests of its commerce must, as time advances, and as its commerce thrives, undergo change and development from various causes which are altogether independent of the ac tion of its courts. In England, at least, it is beyond the jurisdiction of her tribunals to mould and stereotype national policy. Their function when a case like the present is brought before them is, in my opinion, not necessarily to accept what was held to have been the rule of policy a hundred or a hun dred and fifty years ago, but to ascertain, with as near an approach to accuracy as circumstances permit, what is the rule of policy for the then present time. When that rule has been ascertained it becomes their
