Taking up the second course of procedure, Mr. Chaplin says that he " has suggested re ceivership proceedings instead of mandamus, not because mandamus might not be availed of in the present case, but for three reasons : first, because the procedure in mandamus is much less elastic than the procedure in equity; second, because it might be necessary, in mandamus, to seek a State court: and third, because, in man damus, probably immediate provisional relief could not be had, pending the determination of the cause, but the complainants, in addition to their mandamus suit, would very probably be obliged still to institute a suit in equity, — either an independent suit, seeking relief by receiver ship, or, at least, an ancillary suit in aid of the mandamus proceeding. It is, however, proper to allude to the mandamus procedure, partly be cause of its close pertinency to the matters now in question, and partly for the reason that — without regard to the question of immediate relief — a mandamus proceeding might offer a con venient form of compulsory arbitration, which many persons are now calling for, in that it might open up an investigation of the right of the corporations in question to cease operations as they have done during the last six months, including an investigation into the merits of the coal strike as between the operators and the miners, — an investigation which might be of great value for the future, and might not prove necessary to be gone into in a receivership suit." The third remedy pointed out is by suit under the Sherman Act, which is held to be " applica ble to the present situation, and could be in voked to make the procedure in some respects more convenient, and to put on a pressure." This Act was passed by Congress under the power vested in it to " regulate commerce among the several States." "The words ' in restraint of commerce ' in the statute have been very broadly construed by the Supreme Court of the United States; and it has been laid down by the court that the phrase means, not merely unreasonable restraint, but any restraint, and that the statute, therefore, forbids absolutely any combination which tends to restrain interstate trade or commerce, as well as any attempt to monopolize any part of it. "This statute is probably the most radical stntute in character that has ever been passed
by Congress. In a variety of particulars it de parts from the settled rules of judicial procedure, which apply to all, or practically all, the vast body of other congressional legislation. It has seven distinct operations, as follows: "First. It makes all such combinations illegal and null. "Second. It makes participation in them crim inal, and punishable by heavy penalties. "Third. It authorizes prevention by injunc tion of the acts forbidden, thus radically depart ing from the general principle of law that a court of equity will not interpose by injunction to pre vent the commission of a crime. "Fourth. Such preventive power is vested in all the circuit courts of the United States, in whatever State sitting, without regard to the question of locality of the wrongs or of the per sons accused. "Fifth. The Act makes it the duty of the several District Attorneys of the United States, under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, to commence proceedings in equity to enforce its provisions. "Sixth. It provides for seizure and forfeit of any ' property owned under any such unlawful contract, or by any such unlawful combination, or pursuant to any such unlawful conspiracy, and being the subject thereof, and being in the course of transportation from one State to another.' "Seventh. Any individual injured in his business or property by reason of anything for bidden or declared unlawful by the Act, may sue therefor in a circuit court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy (that is, however small his damage may be), and may recover, not merely the damage he has suffered, but threefold the damages that he has sustained, and also, in addition to the ordinary costs of suit, his reasonable disbursements in the employment of counsel,— a provision found, it is believed, in no other statute of the United States." Two cases under the Sherman Act are con sidered at some length : Knight v. American Sugar Refinery Company, 156 U. S. 1, decided in 1894, where it was " held that upon the facts as presented to the court by the bill in equity — not, it will be observed, upon the facts as they may have existed, or upon the facts universally known then and now to the public — the acts
