The Market Value of Speech.
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THE MARKET VALUE OF SPEECH. By Wm. Archibald McClean. THE wisdom of all ages tells how speech may do superlative harm. The vast majority of men owning good names would rather feel the knife or bullet in the physical body than the sting of the stain of a ven omous tongue upon a fair name. It is those who have lost the possession of a good name who frequently not only love company but also know better than others the price of the sting of their efforts to get company. To utterly destroy a good name for mere purposes of wrecking, for that is all it ever amounts to, is the work of satanic meanness and often brings the victim irreparable in jury. In this light the offense of the slanderer should be punished in the very highest finan cial terms, for a good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. Yet the reverse seems to be the rule with juries. The mar ket value of a slander seems to be low. It is a cheap thing in the eyes of juries. Judges often condemn the act in the severest of language, yet the verdicts do not seem to be in proportion to the condemnation. There may be many explanations for this. Perhaps juries become more preoccupied with the slander itself than the injury done and its value. Perhaps the good name be fore the end of the trial grows suspicious, not enough suspicious to say the owner was robbed of nothing, yet enough to question the value of it. Perhaps an allowance is always made for the thoughtless talk of the world, which is not really meant. Perhaps the rob bing has been done by one possessing the most brazen of tongues, so that unconsciously there enters into the deliberations of the jury the thought that the source of the slanderous injury could do little harm to any one else
than its author. Perhaps the circumstances suggest that the one slandered is more anx ious to acquire money he is hard up for than about his good name. Whatever the reasons may be it seems to be true that the verdicts of juries for the loss of good names do not bring great riches. It might be hurriedly concluded that in a land where freedom of speech is guaranteed in its constitution, the citizens would value lightly any curtailment of speech. This, however, is no explanation, for the act of the slanderer has nothing to do with liberty of speech. It is not a liberty he enjoys, but a license he takes at his peril. He has a right to the air he breathes, but not to pollute and foul that which he does not use to the injury of his neighbor. He has the right to open his mouth and wag his tongue as much as he pleases, even though he may display his own mental smallness, provided in the act he does not mentally tramp upon the toes of others, provided in the enjoyment of his rights of speech he does not injure his neighbor. In so much as injury is done his neighbor, he must suffer for his acts. When the market value of speech comes to be considered as expressed in dollars and cents, for many get down to a few pennies, it is necessary to keep in mind the legal def inition of the two-headed monster — slan der. First, there are words, falsely spoken of a person, which impute to the party some criminal offense, involving moral turpitude, for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished. Such words are actionable per se. The utterance of them necessarily imports injury. The proof of the words will be proof of the damage.
