lished by one of the States of the Union, and called by a name used in the treaty. Upon the other hand, it is believed that the word " piracy," as used in the treaty with Great Britain does not refer to the offense as recognized in the law of nations, as the accused can be tried in the country in which he happens to be. Its reference is unquestionably to "piracy" under the local law of the State making the demand. The treaties require that the offense should be committed within " the jurisdiction " of the demanding nation. A question has arisen
in this country as to whether the words "within the territories and jurisdiction " are intended to include a case in which a nation by statute law has made it an offense for one of its own citizens to commit a serious crime outside its own territory, so that a surrender could be demanded by that nation, although the act was committed within the territory of a nation which had ample power to in flict proper punishment. While this point is not finally settled, the probability is that extradition would be refused by the United States in the circumstances named.
A KENTUCKY COURT ROOM. By Enoch Johnson. ONE who is accustomed to the solemnity and decorum of procedure which pre vail in courts of justice in the North, would have had his sense of the fitness of things rather rudely shocked, if he had paid a visit with me to a certain Southern court-room. While on a short trip to a flourishing county-seat in Kentucky, I attended a crim inal trial that was then on in the court-house. What I saw and heard furnished me with ample evidence that they do some things differently in the South. The judge was a typical Kentuckian, free and easy in his manner on the bench, and with that peculiar, roseate hue of complexion which indicated that besides being a judge of the law, he might also be a fairly good judge of that delicious distillation which has made Kentucky famous. He was not one of your judices doctissimi, with pride of opinion that would not yield to argument. Not a bit of it. On the contrary, he seemed to take a delight in arguing the points with the attorneys in the case. When, for in
stance, an objection to certain evidence would be made, which objection his Honor was disposed to overrule : " I don't see any good ground for that objection, Mr. Brown," the judge would say, clapping his hands back of his head, tilting his chair and elevating his feet to the top of his desk. Mr. Brown would rise and maintain that there was good ground for it. The judge would shift his quid from one side of his mouth to the other and come back with an answer; the lawyer would reply; the judge (in pleading parlance) would give back a rejoinder; the lawyer would rise with a surrejoinder; the judge would turn, fire a liquid volley at a spittoon about ten feet away (and in this display the accuracy of Kentucky marksmanship), and clinch his argument with a rebutter that usually left our friend Mr. Brown in sore straits for a surrebutter; and his objection would finally be overruled because the judge had the better of the argument. But the man in the court room who in
