Development of Trial be admitted by that jfury. in too many cases it retards 245 justification? Certainly not, nor can we admit that the continued requirement of a unanimous verdict can be insisted on for a like reason. Some states of our union have lately adopted the requirement of only a three-fourths majority in civil actions to render a verdict. This we find to be the case in California, Texas, and w1th some restrictions, in Connecticut. The general tendency, I think, is to dispense with the rule of unanimity in civil cases, and in accordance with the fundamental law, to re tain it in criminal cases, and this in order to give the defendant, as criminal, every pos sible advantage of doubt. It is claimed that the requirement of a unanimous verdict secures a full and free deliberation of the case by the jurors, but our experience has taught us that in nearly every case the mind of the juror is made up before he leaves the box for deliberation, and if he has not made up his mind one way or the other, we con sider him a weak-minded creature who will vote with the majority no matter how that may be, and whose judgment is therefore of little account. We have said that the requirement of a unanimous verdict secured to the defendant as criminal every chance of doubt. If any one of the twelve has a con scientious doubt of his guilt, it is to be construed in his favor. But let us look at it from another point of view. Suppose eleven of the jury are in favor of acquittal and only one holds out for conviction. Is it right that the man should again be put in jeopardy? We do not wish to exaggerate the evils of the present system, but that it contains inconsistencies there can be no doubt. It would be extraordinary indeed to believe that every man of a jury of twelve men was free from every form of deception, and un der the present system, the successful brib ery of one is sufficient to render the verdict of no avail. That the rule of a unanimous ver dict worked well two or three centuries ago will not be doubted, but under changed con ditions and such as exist at present it must
justice and shields criminals. The whole argument in favor of the jury system and the rule of unanimity, aside from its history, is that it throws a more com plete safeguard about the rights of the 1n dividual and relieves him from the personal injury which he might suffer from the hands of a single and unscrupulous judge. That it does this no one will doubt, and that under favorable circumstances it might do much more for the administration of impartial jus tice, is equally as true, but it too often hap pens that because of incompetence or prejudice or fraud a decision cannot be reached and impartial justice fails to be ad ministered. I have mentioned a few of the leading characteristics of the present jury system with a view of showing some of its in consistencies and with a dfesire, equally as strong, to praise its redeeming qualities. An incident is related which happened in a criminal court and which admirably illus trates the value of a verdict of an incompe tent jury. The charge was that of larceny, and after the counsel for the defendant had established the incapacity of his client to commit a crime, because of his idiocy, to the surprise of every one, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The judge laconically re marked that he supposed counsel for the defense would move for a new trial, and in reply the counsel said that it would hardly be desirable, for he believed that his un fortunate client had already received that greatest privilege and priceless heritage, a trial by a jury of his peers. It is argued, and correctly, I think, that such cases of incompetency are inherent in any system depending on the wisdom and judgment of human beings, and yet such judgment must be made use of else we should be comoelled to suffer the criminal to go unpunished and allow social order and regard for justice to fall into disrepute. The jury system as well as the Judge are now on trial at the bar of public opinion.
