vey. He must make up his mind whether the witness is true or false, biased or free from bias, informed or ignorant, accurate or blundering, intelligent or stupid. He must regulate his cross-examination in accordance with his view on these points. He may begin in any one of several ways. He may seem to follow up the opposing counsel by putting a question certain to obtain the same answer as before, and so put the witness off his guard. Or he may put an indifferent question of no importance, and create the impression that there is to be nothing in his examination, and in this way put the witness off his guard. Or he may boldly put a disconcerting question, the very terms of which will show the witness that he has given wrong evidence, and is about to be righted, whether he likes it or not. This last method of attack does not put him off his guard, but it puts him off his balance, which is worse. Some lawyers prefer one method to the other modes, but an accomplished lawyer should be able to adopt each method in its turn, i.e., where in his judgment, it is required for his purpose. His purpose is to present, by means of the witness in hand, the view of the facts for which the examiner is contending; and in order to do this he must get the witness to alter what is adverse, retint what has been wrong colored, and supply what has been left out. All this is not to be done without a struggle, and it is a struggle in which the advantage is with the witness, if he only knows how to use it. The witness is master of the situation, but is often not master of himself. He has said his say, and as he has presumably said it correctly, he should stand to it if he can. And he can, if he can. But often he can't, though ever so willing, and even determined. If the cross-examiner makes him feel that he has beer, wrong in his answers by ever so little, the process of introspection conflicts with the weighing of the succeeding questions, and the effort to do both at the same time generally ends in
mental confusion, under which he gives himself away even more than to the extent of correcting previous answers. He now gives answers which themselves require the corrective of re-examination. We are dealing with the witness at all points as a witness of truth. But even an honest witness may lose sight of the three limbs of the oath — (l) the truth, (2) the whole truth, (3) nothing but the truth. The first and third items are not so difficult for a leal and soothfast witness, but the second often troubles him. " The whole truth " demands intelligence as well as probity. The natural tendencies of the mind are not extinguished by the taking of an oath, and only in the finer, natures are these tendencies even restrained by the solemnity of the judicial formula and sur roundings. The tendency of most minds is towards exaggeration, which operates, now in enlarging, and now in minimizing, accord ing to the bent of the witness to or from the view he is being examined to advance. This tendency, even when the witness is uncon scious of it, prevents him from seeing things in the clear light required for their proper discernment, and he leaves out or adds on a bit, just ever so little, without knowing it. That bit makes all the difference. Another tendency of the mind is toward complete ness. Incompleteness creates a sense of dissatisfaction, which is best overcome by rounding off the thing, whatever it may be. The incurable habit of telling more than the witness knows, of adding hearsay evidence to his own evidence, is to be ascribed to this love of completeness, which operates retro — back to the beginning of a series of occur rences, of which the deponent witnessed only the last half, or less. Again, some people feel humiliated when they have to say, " I don't know." When these people are in the witness-box, they are apt to sustain their reputation for knowledge by testifying what they do not know, without knowing it, or even suspecting it.
