same, but it may vary in degree. There is no purpose in the mind of the witness to misrepresent the truth, much less to commit perjury. The witness may even be a person of scrupulous honesty, but partisanship in the witness-box is as fatal to fair evidence as blue spectacles to the discernment of colors. With this difference : you can put off the spectacles and see better without them, but you can't put off partisanship, chiefly because you don't know or admit, even to yourself, that you had put it on. Moreover, the partisan sentiment is gener ally entertained from a sense of duty which lends a sanction to all that the sentiment prompts, and even supplies the witness with a combativeness and heat which, with the unskilled and ignorant, often pass for honest indignation at hearing the truth called in question. When partisanship is conscious, it is easier to deal with it than when it is unconscious. It betrays the witness to some extreme which warns the examiner and supplies the skillful cross-examiner with all he needs for beginning his work. When the witness is honest and unconscious of his bias, he esteems his own answers as contain ing the naked truth, and he regards the questioner who tries, by examination, crossexamination, or re-examination, to get him to vary or alter his answers as a hired perverter of the truth as far as the witness will allow him. In this frame of mind, little wonder witnesses cherish harsh thoughts of lawyers, and hug themselves on their own superior honesty — by way of contrast rather than comparison. A witness sometimes puts an obstacle to truth in his own way by constituting himself, perhaps unconsciously, the judge of the cause. He knows what is in dispute, and he knows the facts of the case pretty fully (but not fully), and he con1es to the con clusion that this side or that should win. This is partisanship, but growing from a new root. In this case, the witness does not trust the court, except with his valuable
help. He feels bound to keep the judge right, and seeks to supply in his own evidence all that he thinks needful for deciding the case — as he thinks it should be decided. This witness forgets that his testimony is but a link, less or more im portant, in the chain. As his evidence is meant to bring about a certain end, he works up to that end with what skill he happens to possess, and, though he may never swear falsely, he is difficult for the examiner to handle, and he, too, resents the handling, and blames the wicked ex aminer. His human nature goes with him into the witness-box, remains with him there, and steps down with him, and pre vents him from thinking, and saying, with Cassius — "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves," If he had the suspicion, even, that he might be wrong or biased, or unfit to be a judge, he would probably be a better witness, for we are assuming him to be honest in his purpose. W'hen the witness is there to perjure himself he belongs to a class apart, he needs the attention of the best examiners, and he deserves, and will probably receive, the attention of the public prosecutor. We need not trouble ourselves with him here, but only say that, however the litigant he favors may regard him, he is an object of horror to the lawyers on both sides. If he begets wrath in the opposing lawyer, he excites loathing in the other. To the honor of the legal profession it can truly be said that we have few, if any, practitioners will ing to win their case by perjury. We have seen that partisanship may be conscious or unconscious, but perjury is partisanship which is often inspired, is always inten tional, and is careless of consequences if the purposes be served. But witness-bearing depends not only on the animus, but also on the powers and opportunities of observation, and the con
