a dam, which is nonsense, for the land is thus wholly and exclusively occupied, and the sheriff can put the owner in possession. Exactly the contrary was held in Nichols v. Lewis. 15 Conn. 137, or rather that ejectment lies for land covered by water, the court observing: "where the property is tangible, and an entry can be made, and possession can be delivered to the sheriff, this action will lie."' So in Steadman v. Smith, 8 Ell. & B. I, ejectment was held to lie to remove a roof projecting over the whole width of a party wall. In the Vermont case the court said : — "It is clearly not essential that the intruding object should actually rest upon the plaintiffs soil to entitle him to the action of ejectment, for this action will lie for an upper room in a dwelling house or other building. As the law gives the owners of the land all above it within its boundaries we can find no reason, resting in principal, why, for the projection by a party of a portion of his building over the land of another, as in this case, lie may not be liable in ejectment. The plaintiff was disseised of his land, and the defendant was in the wrongful possession thereof by his projecting roof. There is no more difficulty in de scribing in a declaration a projection over the soil than one upon it, nor can there be any difficulty in the sheriff deliver ing possession to the plaintiff." It seems to us that a very simple test will deter mine the matter : suppose the plaintiff desired to ele vate his barn, and found the defendant's eaves in the way : how would he get them out of the way? Must he resort to nuisance? It seems not, but that the direct suit for removal by ejectment is the natural remedy. More Dog Law. — In remarking upon the recent Tennessee case respecting dogs, we find that we omitted several minor points of interest, namely, that the right to recover for injury to a dog is not lost by his owner's killing him in the honest but mistaken belief that he was fatally injured; that a motorman cannot rely upon the celerity of a dog to absolve him from all duty and care to avoid running over him with his car; and that it is matter of common knowledge that pedigree enters into the consideration of the value of dogs, including such as are kept for sporting. This particular dog was "setting" or "standing" at some birds in the street on the line of the track, when the motorman (or the motorneer, as some courts villainously call him) ran him down without slowing up orringing his gong. "Setting" and " standing" mean the same in dog parlance. According to the famous mule case in Pennsylvania the motorman owed no duty to sound his gong, because the dog could not be supposed to listen and take warning, but that case is bad law — asinine law, if we maybe pardoned the expression. (See 3 Green Bag, p. 27.) We think this Tennessee case goes to the extreme of tenderness toward dogs, and its doctrine may tend to diminish the " celerity" of street cars in dog-haunted districts
of large cities. " In the earlier books," remarked the court, " it was said that ' dog law ' was as hard to define as was ' dog latin,' but that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." Imagine blind justice with a dog in each eye! Certain other remarks of the court deserve quotation in full : "There are high and low degrees among dogs as well as among men, and while the common coon dog has his value, it is not the same as that of the trained bird dog or the trained bloodhound. It is a matter of common knowledge and observation that certain strains of blood among horses add materially to, if they do not entirely fix, their values, and so among cows and hogs and sheep, and even among chickens and turkeys. Different strains of blooded horses are valuable because it is found that for generations the achievements of horses of that strain have been noteworthy upon the turf and elsewhere; and so with dogs, these qualities, as a matter of common observation, are much the same, in the same strain, for generation after generation. We think there is no error in admitting evidence upon these matters of pedigree, and the reputation of this particular dog killed is shown to have had what in dog circles is re garded as ' blue blood,' and among these he belonged to the inner circles of the '400,' — a member of the ' F. F. T.'s,' or ' first Families of Tennessee.' In addition, he was of English descent. His sire was 'Champion Tribulation, by imp. Beppo III., out of imp. Champion Lass of Bow,' and so on for twenty or more generations. His dam was ' Dick's Sue, by Dick, out of Ida Heath,' etc., for as many generations. It is fully shown that on both sides the an cestry is traced back to the best of English nobility blood in dog circles. The sire of the dog is shown to have had a remarkable record in field trials and bench shows, and so with the dam. Dogs of the grade of the dog that was killed, and with such pedigree, are shown by the proof to be worth from $500 to $1,000 in the market. It is also shown that this dog had had the distemper, and under the proof, this added to his value 100 percent. It is attempted to show that this dog's descent may not have been entirely pure, and it is intimated that he may have had ' terrier blood ' in him, but the only foundation for this inference is the fact that he ' tarried ' so long on the track when the car was ap proaching. But it appears from the record that it is a characteristic of the pointer when he sets to become ob livious to all earthly surroundings, and the bluer his blood the more absent-minded he becomes on such an occasion. The question of pedigree is really important so far only as it bears upon the question of value of the animal killed. The plaintiff fixes the value of the dog at S250, without any reference to his blood or lineage, and in this he is sustained. He describes him as a handsome dog, very fast, wide ranger, very staunch on his game and to the gun, thoroughly broken, a line retriever from land or water, with an excellent dispo sition. He is shown also to have been a valuable, reliable yard and house dog, and to have made himself generally useful, and almost indispensable to the plaintiff's household. With such an eloquent recital of the dog's qualities, the jury could not, perhaps, have given less damages than $250." We are glad to learn how " terrier " is pronounced in judicial circles in Tennessee.
