The Advocate in the Olden Times.
35 1
selves, and to have plumed themselves not a tablish a reputation and attract clients. But little on their black-letter lore. Cicero, how a latitude was allowed in those days wholly ever, ridicules their pretensions, and in his unknown in the strict and formal system of speech in defense of Murena says that three judicial proceedings in England. Even when days are sufficient to master this kind of the cause depended upon the investigation of learning. " If, therefore, you put me on my abstruse points of law, — on the interpreta mettle, overwhelmed with business as I am, tion of the Twelve Tables, or the construc I will in three days declare myself a juris tion of a will, — the advocate employed ar consult." We can easily imagine that such guments and indulged himself in appeals, men, either from inability to speak, or disin addressed, not to the understanding, but to clination, or want of confidence in their own the feelings and passions of the court. A powers, or dislike of contentious and noisy jest supplied the place of an authority, and strife might decline to practice in the forum. loose declamatory harangues were some This is what happens in England where, as times permitted to influence decisions, which a distinct branch of the profession, there are ought to have been formed upon the closest many most able men, who have a large and most rigid investigation of legal prin amount of practice at chambers, and yet do ciples. Rhetoric and logic had not then, not appear in court, and pass their lives im as with us, distinct and separate domains. mersed in law as conveyancers or special The former constantly invaded the province pleaders, without ever arguing a single case. of the latter, and in cases where we should But we are surprised to find such a broad think it unworthy, as indeed it would be line of distinction as was recognized at Rome hopeless, to employ any other means for between the jurisconsult and the advocate our clients than close and severe argument, with regard to legal attainments. Not that the Roman counsel would condescend to the the latter might not be, and frequently was, use of the most transparent sophistry, and en an able lawyer, but a knowledge of law was deavor, too often successfully, by raillery and considered a very secondary object with wit to obtain judgment in his favor. But we him in comparison with other qualifications. must not forget the difference between the It appears at first sight inexplicable how the tribunals in the two countries. The Roman Roman advocates should have ventured to jut/ices were, as we have seen, much more undertake causes involving nice and techni like jurymen than judges, and therefore cal questions of law, without having previ liable to be imposed upon by fallacies ously prepared themselves by a careful study which, if addressed to a modern English of its rules and principles, and that, notwith court, would render the counsel who pro standing, they should have been able to es pounded them merely ridiculous.
