"The clothing of every member is a source of comfort and enjoyment to all. It is as essential as the food placed on the table. Indeed, the services of a physician to one member of the family have been deemed a family expense; and so a watch and chain used by the wife and daughter only. Schrader v. Hoover, 80 Iowa, 243; Marquardt v. Flaugher, 60 Iowa, 148. Wearing apparel is not confined in its meaning to clothing, but includes the idea of orna mentation as well. A watch and chain have been adjudged such. Brown v. Edmonds, 8 S. D. 271; Stewart v. McClung, 12 Or. 431; 53 Am. Rep. 374; Bumpus v. Maynard, 38 Barb. 626. Contra, see Smith v. Rogers, 16 Ga. 480; Rothschild v. Boelter, 18 Minn. 361 (Gil. 331); Gooch v. Gooch, 33 Me. 535; Sawyer v. Sawyer 28 Vt. 252. See 29 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 38. In Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 252, a breastpin is held to be a part of the wearing apparel of a deceased husband, which, under the Vermont statute, goes to the widow. But the Supreme Court of New Hampshire adjudged a breastpin not to be ' wearing apparel necessary for the debtor and his family.' Towns v. Pratt [33 N. H. 345], 66 Am. Dec. 726. The question of value and necessity is somewhat controlling in some of the cases referred to. By ' wearing apparel ' is usually meant clothing and garments protecting the person from exposure and not articles of ornament merely. Originally it included not only the vesture, but all the ornaments and decorations worn with it. That jewelry, when of no purpose other than that of ornament, as a ring, will not be so classified, may be conceded. But if it serves the double purpose of being an article of use, in fastening the garments, or otherwise, and also of adornment to the person, there appears no good reason for not adjudging it a part of the wearing apparel; else much that is pleasing in dress must be excluded from the meaning of the word, as generally accepted. The ornamentation of a lady's wardrobe is of little utility, yet it is always included in the term. If an article of jewelry is used with, and as a part of, the clothing, it may well be deemed a portion of the wearing apparel. It may thus serve as necessary and use ful a purpose as the garments themselves. {Articles of jewelry were often adjudged necessaries for which the husband was liable at common law. Raynes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424; Porter s. Briggs, 38 Iowa, 166; 18 Am. Rep. 27, These are quite as commonly worn by many people as the clothing that covers them. The make of a shirt or the taste of the wearer may be such as to require some kind of a button or stud. If the inexpensive pearl were used, no one would question the propriety of making it a family charge. But it might be as much out of place in the shirt front of a person of fashion or fortune as a diamond in that of one who earns his bread by the sweat of his face. If the cost, the utility, or the necessity is to be the criterion, then the line must be drawn on many articles of furniture, clothing, and food. What shall be the delicacies of the table, the adornments of the person, and the character of the furnishings, must be left to the better judgment and discretion of each family, which is presumed to, and ordinarily does, act as a unit in such matters. Many families would have no use for terrapin, silks and satins, or Smyrna rugs, or costly jewelry, and in such cases neither husband nor wife would be liable for indebtedness incurred by the other therefor. But, if these are purchased for, and
used in, the family, it is not perceived on what ground they may not be deemed a family charge. Under our statute, there is no occasion for inquiry as to the cost or necessity. Nor is there better reason to investigate the character or value of a button or stud worn, in determining whether it is a family expense, than that of a costly dress, an artisti cally trimmed bonnet, or a silk tile. The article may be unnecessary, or such as the family ought to have dispensed with, or of no actual utility; still, if purchased for, and used in, the family, the liability of the wife cannot be avoided. Dodd v. St. John, 22 Or. 250; 15 L. R. A. 717." A Coat that led to a Suit. — In McCann v. Consolidated Traction Co., 59 N. J. S. 481; 38 L. R. A. 236, it was held that where black coats, belonging to employes operating a sprinkler running on an electric steel railway, by waving in the wind frightened a gentle and well-broken horse, causing him to run away and injure his driver, a verdict of damages against the company was maintainable. The ccurt said : "In Mallory v. Griffey, 85 Pa. 275, the questions whether the fright of a horse was occasioned by a large stone along the highway, and whether it was calculated to frighten an ordinary, quiet, and well-broken horse, and whether the defendant was negligent in placing such stone there, were left to the jury. Jeffrey v. St. Pancras Vestry, 63 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 618, was a case where a steam roller frightened plaintiff's horse, by puffing out steam. The question of recovery was held to have been properly submitted to the jury. In this latter case, Collin, J., speaking of the con struction of a carriage for use on a highway, says : ' But, on the other hand, if he has his carriage constructed and painted in such a manner as to be very conspicuous indeed, it might then become a nuisance.' Liability has been established where a horse was frightened by a plow being left alongside a public road. Harris v. Mobbs, L. R. 3 Exch. Div. 268; where the noise and appearance of a steam engine were calculated to frighten horses (Watkins v. Reddin, 2 Fost. & F. 629-634). In Phelon v. Stiles 43 Conn. 426, the servant, in delivering bran for his master, left several bags by the roadside, his object being to save unnecessary transportation, and to give him time to attend to some private business of his own; but it was held that he was acting in his master's employment, and that the latter was liable for an injury caused by the fright of a horse caused by the bags of bran. In Howe v. Young, 16 Ind. 312, the plaintiff's complaint averred that his horse was frightened, and his buggy damaged, by the defendant's driving his horse and wagon along the highway in a reckless manner. On demurrer the complaint was held good. Elliott, Roads & Streets, p. 624." The court distinguished Walton v. N. Y. Cent. Sleeping Car Co., 139 Mass. 556, " where the porter of a drawing room or parlor car threw a package or bundle containing soiled clothing and other articles, from the train. Arrangements by the porter had been previously made that some person at the place should pick up and take care of the package for him. The package struck the plaintiff, and injured him. It was held that the act of the porter was not the act of the company, nor in the course of his employment, but for his own convenience."
