it. Sir James Stephen attacked this view rational judgment on the moral character of very much in the same way that the late Dr. the act which he meant to do." And again, Newman attacked the thirty-nine articles in "knowledge and power are the constituent Tract No. 90, which produced a crisis in the elements of all voluntary actions, and if Oxford movement. Newman " tested the either is seriously impaired, the other is dis elasticity" of the articles, and showed that abled. It is as true that a man who cannot they could be made to sanction -nearly all control himself does not know the nature of the doctrines supposed to be distinctive of his acts, as that a man who does not know the Church of Rome. So Stephen con the nature of his acts is incapable of selftended that the words control." This en lightened view, which "kiiow the nature and gives a rational place moral quality of his to moral insanity as act," if liberally and an exculpatory plea properly construed, in criminal cases, has covered the doctrine now annexed the sup of moral insanity, port of practically the which they were de whole English bench. signed to exclude. It may be interest He suggested that the ing and instructive to law of England should substantiate this state run thus: No act is ment by reference to a crime if the person a few modern cases who does it is at the which are probably time when it is done not very well known prevented either byon the other side of defective mental the Atlantic. Mr. power, or by disease Justice Stephen re affecting the mind, peatedly applies his (a) from knowing the own views in prac nature or quality of tice. Thus, at the trial his act, or (b) from knowing the act is of a man named Kurt, JEAN-ÉTIENXE-DOMINIQUK KSQUIROL. at Norwich assizes, wrong, or (c) from on 9th November, controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of 1885, on a charge of feloniously causing control has been produced by his own default. grievous bodily harm, he stated that " if a But an act may be a crime although the man were in a state of passionate rage, ex mind of the person who does it is affected by cited by disease, which violently interfered disease, if such disease does not in fact pro with his actions, so that he had not a fair duce upon his mind one or other of the capacity to weigh what he was doing, effects above mentioned in reference to the he was not responsible." Again, in 1888, act. Speaking of the knowledge of right at Glamorgan assizes, on the trial of a and wrong, the same great judge said : " I man named Davies, his lordship said to think that anyone would fall within that de the jury: " Knowing the act is wrong means scription (i.e. inability to know the quality nothing more or less than the power of of his act) who was deprived, by disease thinking about it, the same as a sane man affecting his mind, of the power of passing a would; the power of attaining to a full con
