information in the name of the attorney general, in chancery, invoking the original jurisdiction of the court — which it will ex ercise in matters publia juris — to restrain the secretary of state from sending out no tices of election to the several counties under the election laws, this being the initial move ment in the election machinery. It was strenuously objected that the court had no jurisdiction; that the legislature had dis cretion in the matter which the court could not review; that it was a political, not a ju dicial question; the remedy retained by the people and not committed to the courts, etc. The court unanimously decided that it had jurisdiction, and that the act was void for violation of the constitutional require ments. The governor then reconvened the legislature, and a new apportionment act was passed in July, 1892; but this act was not free from gerrymander features. A second suit was brought. This time the attorney general refused to file an informa tion, or to allow his name to be used by the real prosecutor. The court ruled that it would entertain the suit upon the relation of any suitor who was an elector, and that its jurisdiction to entertain the suit did not rest upon the will or consent of the attorney general to the filing of an information. It assumed jurisdiction, allowed the attorney general's name to be used against his con sent, heard the case, and decided the second apportionment invalid. A second extra ses sion then passed an act which, though much complained of, was not attacked in the courts. These decisions gave a wholesome check to this unjust and vicious practice of the prac tical politician, and were hailed with satis faction by the friends of good government throughout the country. AN ELECTIVE JUDICIARY.
There was considerable opposition in the constitutional convention to an elective ju diciary. Happily, however, the State has
suffered thus far none of the evils prophesied as sure to follow such a system. In every case, the judge appointed by the executive to fill a vacancy until an election can be had has been elected by the people at the next election. In but one case — that of Judge Crawford, defeated on the fugitive slave law issue, — has a sitting judge been defeated at the polls. In only one instance has a judge desirous of remaining on the bench been dropped at the end of his term, — the case of Judge Abram D. Smith, above mentioned in his biographical sketch. In no instance has a sitting judge been candidate for re election upon the nomination of a political party, and in but a few cases have any judges been opposed by candidates of the opposite party. Of late years, the better elements of both parties strongly deprecate any drawing of party lines in a judicial election, which, as a safeguard against partisan strife, is not held on the day of general election, but at the " freeman's meeting " held in the spring. Even in the election of circuit judges the politics of the candidate is rarely taken into account; and a judge reasonably satisfactory in the performance of his duty is usually reelected at the end of his six-year term. Practically, an election in Wisconsin to the circuit or supreme bench means for life, if the incumbent desires to continue on it. When the State was Democratic, a Whig chiefjustice — Whiton — was elected. When the State has been substantially Republican, four judges, who were prominent Democrats, have been elected. When Judge Pinneywas a candidate in 1891, his rival was also a Democrat. When Judge Dixon was elected in 1860, his competitor was also a Republi can. When Judge Winslow was a candidate in 1895 for the full term, he was opposed by a Republican, but many of the Republican leaders, journals and ablest lawyers, took strong ground in his favor, because the opposition to him was merely partisan. With the single exception above mentioned, no judge has ever been driven from the
