The Legal Aspect of the Maybrick Case. WHAT THEN IS THE LEGITIMATE RESULT OF A REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE CAUSE OF DEATH IN A CASE IN ENGLISH COURTS WHERE THE PRISONER HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF MURDER?
Mrs. Maybrick was tried on a single count, which charged her with having " at Garston on the nth of May, 1889, feloni ously, wilfully, and of her malice afore thought killed and murdered one James Maybrick by the administration to him of poison." Arsenic being the poison relied on by the Crown, the judge told the jury: — "It is essential to this charge that the man died of arsenic. This question must be to the foundation of a verdict unfavorable to the pris oner that he died of arsenic." Therefore, if the jury had entertained the same doubt as to death by arsenic which the judge, the Home Secretary, and the Premier entertained, it is clear that they must have found the prisoner not guilty of the only charge with which they had to deal. And on any principle of reason and justice, why should the fact that the jury had arrived at a wrong verdict on the evi dence before them have militated against the prisoner? The Home Secretary should have dealt with the prisoner as if the right verdict had been found. This was done in the famous case of Dr. Thomas Smelhurst, which in many of its features closely resem bled that of Mrs. Maybrick. The report on which he received a free pardon stated that, "though the facts were full of sus picion against Smelhurst, there was not absolute and complete proof of his guilt." And only four years before the Maybrick trial the then Home Secretary, Sir William Vernon Harcourt, granted a free pardon to Mr. John Hay because there was " a doubt as to his identity." Since the Maybrick trial, too, the Home Secretary refused to admit that there was anything more than a reasonable doubt in the case of John Hclsall, whom he released. The detention of
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Mrs. Maybrick on the conviction for mur der cannot therefore be sustained after the admissions of the judge, the Home Secre tary, and the Premier. The only question is whether a life-sentence can be justified on the ground relied on by the then Home Secretary, viz. : That the evidence clearly leads to the conclusion, that she had ad ministered and attempted to administer ar senic to her husband with the intention of murdering him. DID THE JURY FIND THIS, OR OUGHT THEV TO HAVE FOUND IT?
That the jury did not find it is clear. No doubt in finding that Mrs. Maybrick "feloniously, wilfully, and of her malice aforethought" killed her husband by ad ministering poison to him, they found that she " administered poison to him feloni ously, wilfully, and of her malice afore thought." Probably the reason why they arrived at this finding was that they thought the poison killed him. They did not thinkthat even if he was an habitual arsenic-cater he would take enough to cause death, or else they thought that if he did chance to do so, he would at all events have told the doctors and asked them for an antidote. The part of the verdict which the Home Secre tary upheld was therefore in all probability dependent on that which he rejected; and, in fact, if it were conceded that Mr. Maybrick's death was not caused by arsenical poisoning, the evidence of any wrongful administration of arsenic would be very weak. But what the jury found was that the arsenic was administered by the poisoner "feloniously, wilfully, and of her malice aforethought." The Home Secretary sub stituted, for these words, " with intent to murder." But the import of the phrases in English law is altogether different, and the difference materially affects the prisoner's punishment. It has recently been held in England, that killing a woman by means of an illegal oper
