The Supreme Court of Maine. 575
their debtor, had reasonable cause to believe he was insolvent. The opinion holds that they had express notice by a letter which brought the security to their hands, and disposes of the technical objection above alluded to by the plain rule, that when but one inference only can be drawn from the facts of the case, it is a matter of law.
Of his opinions, and only a few cursory glances are attempted here, it may be truly said that they disclose force, diligence and vivacity. There is nothing feigned in them; on the contrary they possess a genuineness of his own, hearty, and sometimes idiomatic way, based on the primary virtue of justice and the courage to be just. He has an alert mind. "He is one of the quickest," says a well-known Federal judge, "to see the point upon which a case turns." His style reminds one at times of the old English judges, and almost rivalling in brevity his associate, Mr. Justice Walton. Eight lines in the case of Hart v. McLellan, 80 Maine, 95, will show this: "Haskell, J. Assumpsit against the indorser of a negotiable promissory note payable at a place certain. A careful consideration of the evidence fails to show legal notice to the defendant of the dishonor of the note. The notice seasonably mailed was not addressed to a post-office in the city of the defendant's residence, nor, as the authorities cited by defendant's counsel clearly show, was reasonable diligence used to ascertain the defendant's proper address. Judgment for defendant." Then, again, when the opinion is full and copious with authorities, it broadens and deepens like a New England brook before it joins the bay, coming from pure springs, dashing down over the hill-side to join the vast ocean of the live law.
Speaking of cruel and abusive treatment in Holyoke v. Holyoke, 78 Maine, 404, as a cause for divorce, he says: "This phrase does not necessarily imply physical violence, thought it may include it. Words and deportment may work injury as deplorable as violence to the person. 'I will speak daggers to her, but use none,' says Shakespeare. Temperament and character so widely differ, that conduct cruel to one, might scarcely annoy a more callous nature. Having in mind the sacred character of the marital relation, and its influence on the happiness and purity of society, as well as upon individuals, not overlooking considerations that may not be freely discussed, each particular case must be judged of by its own particular facts and circumstances.
"Divorce should not be a panacea for the infelicities of married life; if disappointment, suffering, and sorrow even be incident to that relation, they must be endured. The marriage yoke, by mutual forbearance, must be worn, even thought it rides unevenly, and has becomes burdensome withal. Public policy requires that it should be so. Remove the allurements of divorce at pleasure, and husbands and wives will the more zealously strive to even the burdens and vexations of life, and soften by mutual accommodation so as to enjoy their marriage relation.
"Deplorable as it is, from the infirmities of human nature, cases occur where a wilful disregard of marital duty, by act or word, either works, or threatens injury so serious, that a continuance of cohabitation in marriage cannot be permitted with safety to the personal welfare and health of the injured party. Both a sound body and a sound mind are required to constitute health. Whatever treatment is proved in such particular case to seriously impair, or to seriously threaten to impair either, is like a withering blast, and endangers life, limb, or health, and constitutes the (6) cause for divorce in the act of 1885. Such is the weight of authority."
His familiarity with decided cases gives him the power of selecting the best materials and cases; and he loves to give credit to attorneys who furnish full and orderly briefs. Without "an almost ignominious love of detail," as Sir Arthur Helps says, he sees all
