Moral Insanity as a Defense to Crimes. dulged in these reflections," he adds, " be cause I think the expression ' sudden impulse ' and ' subversion of the will ' are inaccurate and misleading, at least under our jurisprudence. It will be a sad day for this State when ' uncontrollable impulse ' shall dictate a rule of action to our courts." The doctrine of " moral insanity " was again recognized in 1890, this time by the Court of Indiana. The Court held 1 that "a person may have sufficient mental capacity to know right from wrong, and to be able to comprehend the nature and consequence of his act, and yet be not criminally respon sible for his act; for if the will power is so impaired that he cannot resist an impulse to commit a crime, he is not of sound mind." In South Carolina, in 1891 the Court de cided that " moral insanity," or " uncon trollable impulse," was not a defense against crime in that State. Justice Mclver, in writing the opinion of the Court, says, in regard to the doctrine of moral insanity, or uncontrollable impulse : " While it is not to be denied that there are cases in some of the States which recognize this doctrine as a defense against a charge of crime, yet it never has, and we trust never will, obtain a foothold in this State; for we agree with Judge Sherwood when he said, ' It will be a sad day for this State when uncontrollable impulse shall dictate a rule of action to our courts.' He further adds, 'It is a matter that is not susceptible of proof, and to allow a person to escape the consequences of his criminal act, by asserting that he acted under an impulse which he could not restrain, although he knew his act to be unlawful, would be dangerous, if not destructive to the peace of society.'" ' Plake v. State, I2r Ind. 433. 2 State t. Levelle, 24 So. Carolina, 120.
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The above cases are some of the most important on the subject of " moral insan ity," or " irresistible impulse," as a defense to criminal acts that have been decided in the courts of this country, and are sufficient to show the great diversity of opinions among the learned justices of the different States on the subject. By the above decisions it appears that some persons sentenced by the courts of South Carolina, California, or Mississippi, to prison, or even to the gallows, would be by the courts of Alabama, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and some of the other States, dis charged or committed to the insane hospital. Such a diversity of opinion ought not to exist. This mental insanity is either a fact or a theory. If it is a fact, it should be recognized by the courts of all States and countries; if only a theory, the courts have no power to recognize it. Every unknown scientific fact, in whatever profession or department of knowledge, must first be discovered by experts before becom ing a matter of common knowledge. The existence of such a disease as moral insanity is earnestly alleged by modern physicians and experts on insanity. The writer would, therefore, conclude that there is such a dis ease as moral insanity, and that in some cases it would be a good defense to crime. It lies with the medical profession, how ever, to determine in what cases, and to establish a reliable test for sanity if, as they claim, the old rule, which makes " the knowledge of right and wrong the test of criminal responsibility, is too narrow, and its application often erroneous, cruel, and unjust; and the law, which abhors error, cruelty, and injustice, would be made to conform thereto.
