Moral Insanity as a Defense to Crimes. 0 question in this country, was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,' Justice Gibson, recognizing the existence of moral or homicidal insanity as " consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular offense," adds : " There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion, which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance." He adds further : " The doctrine which acknowl edges this mania is dangerous in its rela tions, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases." In a case in Kentucky,1 in the year A.D. 1863, the court recognized the defense of moral insanity in criminal cases, but says, "This ground of defense is so peculiarly liable to abuse, to guard against which the utmost care and circumspection are required, on the part of the Court, in presenting to the jury the legal principles relating to it." In the year A.D. 1870, in a most interest ing case in New Hampshire,3 it was held to be a question of fact for the jury to deter mine, "whether there was such a mental disease as dipsomania " (which is an irre sistible craving for alcoholic liquors). In this case is the learned opinion of Mr. Jus tice Doe, which is one of the most instruc tive discussions on the law of insanity which can be found in legal literature. The court of Connecticut, in the year A.D. 1876,4 said, regarding the subject of moral insanity: "It is not our purpose either to ignore or recognize this form of insanity as an excuse for crime. The question is not whether an act committed under its influence is crimi nal, whether the actor should be punished,or be exempt from punishment, but whether he is a proper subject of capital punishment. If it be conceded that one afflicted with it ■ Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Harr. 264. 2 Scott v. Commonwealth, 4 Mete. 227. 1 State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399. 4 Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514.
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never loses the power to distinguish between right and wrong, and is at all times master of himself, and may control his actions, still his mind may be enfeebled, and the power of his will readily yield to the influence of temptation or provocation without that wil ful, deliberate, and premeditated malice which is essential to constitute murder in the first degree. The jury, therefore, ought to consider moral mania, if satisfied of its existence, in determining the degree of crime, and give it such weight as it is fairly entitled to under the circumstances." The court of Mississippi, in the year 1870,' de nies the doctrine, and the Court, by Justice Chalmers, says : " The possibility of the existence of such a mental condition is too doubtful, the theory is too problematical and too incapable of a practical solution, to afford a safe basis of legal adjudication. It may serve as a metaphysical or psychologi cal problem to interest and amuse the specu lative philosopher, but it must be discarded by the jurist and the law-giver in the prac tical affairs of life." This Court further holds "that insanity, to excuse crime, must be such as to destroy the power of distin guishing between right and wrong." In Alabama, in 1879,1 it was decided by the Court that the doctrine of moral insanity, or irresistible impulse, coexisting with men tal sanity, has no foundation in psychology nor support in law. Judge Stone, in writing the opinion of the Court, says : " There is a species of mental disorder, a good deal dis cussed in modern treatises, sometimes called ' irresistible impulse,' ' moral insanity,' and perhaps by some other names. If by these terms it is meant to affirm that a morbid state of the affections or passions, or an un settling of the moral system, the mental faculties remaining meanwhile in a normal, sound condition* excuses acts otherwise criminal, we are not inclined to assent to the proposition. The senses and mental 1 Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269 1 Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307.
