that the declaration was bad for not alleg ing malice; (3) that it was defective for not alleging want of reasonable and probable cause. The court (Cockburn, C. J., Wightman, Crompton and Mellor, J. J.) gave judg ment for Mr. Justice Blackburn. Crompton, J., said in argument, " It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of any of the superior courts for anything done in his judicial capacity, although it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. The public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for theirbenefit and was established in order to secure the independence of the judges and prevent their being harassed by vexatious actions." In a previous case (Thomas v. Churton) Cockburn, C. J., had said, " I am reluctant to de cide, and will not do so until the question comes before me, that if a judge abuses his judicial office by using slanderous words maliciously and without reasonable and prob able cause, he is not liable to an action." Fray v. Blackburn however probably now dis poses of this point. Most of the leading mer cantile decisions in the Queen's Bench, from 1859 onwards, were delivered by Blackburn. Chief-Justice Cockburn learned not a little of his commercial law from his colleague and for some time after his appointment as Chief Justice was content to let Blackburn give the judgment of the court whenever he was sitting with him. Among Blackburn's chief judgments in the Queen's Bench were: Winsor v. Reg., in which the effect ofdischarge of a jury in criminal cases was fully con sidered; Strauss v. Francis, affirming the right of counsel to compromise an action; Newby v. Van Oppcn, the liability of a foreign corporation to be sued in Fngland; and Arm strong v. Stokes, the liability of undisclosed principals. In the House of Lords however the chief judicial work of this great judge was done. In 1877 he delivered one of the judg ments in Clarke v. Adie, in which the modern patent law as to " subordinate integers" was laid down by the supreme tribunal. In the
same year he delivered the leading judgment in McKinnonz>. Armstrong & Co. as to com pensation and retention in bankruptcy. The following list of decisions may be consulted with advantage by those who desire to trace Lord Blackburn's judicial work in greater de tail. Garnett v. Bradley (3 App. Cas. 962); Dublin etc. Ry. Co. v. Slattery (ib. 1199); Orr-Ewing v. Registrar of Trade-marks (4 App. Cas. at p. 492); Fairlie v. Boosey (ib. 711), piano arrangements of copyright mu sic; Julius v. Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 237), meaning of the words in a statute, " it shall be lawful"; Sturla v. Freccia (ib. 639), statements in " public documents"; the OrrEwing case (9 App. Cas. 42), which gave rise to a curious conflict of jurisdictions between the Scotch and English courts; Collins v. Collins (ib. 228), condonation of adultery; Thomson v. Weems (ib. 671), truth of an swers to queries by a life-insurance company; and Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley (ib. 220), inherent jurisdiction of the courts to dismiss frivolous or vexatious actions. No one who reads these decisions, or a consider able proportion of them, will entertain any doubt as to the propriety of Lord Campbell's selection in 1859. When Lord Blackburn retired from the bench general regret was felt that the Wensleydale peerage case pre vented him from continuing to sit and vote in the House of Lords. In addition to his other work, Lord Blackburn is the author of a standard treatise on the law of sale. LORD BRAMWELL. George William Wilshere, Baron Bramwell, was born in 1808, and received, at the country house of his father, who was a banker, the early commercial training which he subsequently turned to brilliant account. After having practiced for some time as a special pleader, he became a student of Lincoln's Inn in 1830. Six years later he migrated to the Inner Temple, to whose bar he was duly called in 1838. He soon ac quired a large and lucrative practice. In 1849
