from his opening sentence to the close of his argument, ordinarily sarcastic, and fre quently so unkind as to cover the counsel with a feeling of shame and disgust. If a motion was opposed, Walworth not unfrequently abused the counsel on both sides with impartial severity, and as a result both sides left the court angry and bent on re venge should a door ever open by which revenge could be reached. The Conven tion of 1846 opened this door, and men struck at the Court of Chancery, hoping thus to hit their old tormentor in court. In private association he was courteous and re fined, but the moment he ascended the seat of justice his manners became intolerably offensive. Walworth never favored the amelioration of legal practice. Nobody who desired the improvement of legal or equit able practice ever could have thought of intrusting Walworth with power to forward or retard that object." But I once heard the same eminent gentleman address a most eloquent apostrophe to Walworth's portrait in the court room of the Court of Appeals, while praising his invariable protection of the rights of the widow and the orphan. Walworth's judgments are invariably well written, and his power of stating facts clearly and comprehensibly was quite remarkable. They bear all the marks of vast research, patient reflection, acute discrimination, and liberal learning. Occasionally an opinion appears which is apparently the result of long and wide reading of history, travels, and even poetry, like that, for example, in Nevin v. Ladue, on the question whether ale is "strong drink" — a question on which the Chancellor was compelled to resort to the testimony of others, for he himself never drank ale nor anything else stronger than water or tea or coffee. This opinion is one of the most delightful in the books, and forms a worthy and appropriate companion to Chief Justice Daly's celebrated opinion in Cromwell v. Hewitt, as to what consti tutes an inn. It is noteworthy that three
of the senators in Nevin v. Ladue thought that the question which was so learnedly and so charmingly discussed by the Chancellor was not necessarily in the case! But one is glad that the Chancellor brought it in, as he did the widow Van Bummcll. There is a vein of sly humor discoverable in several passages of this famous opinion. For ex ample, he speaks of the Armenians, who according to Xenophon, used a fermented liquor, prepared from grain, which, " like the more refined tippler of the present day, they sucked through a reed or hollow tube." He also speaks of the monkey-catcher who sets vessels filled with bonza " at the foot of the tree on which the animals are gamboling, and then watches at a distance until they come down and regale themselves to intox ication. And we, who have seen the effect of similar proceedings elsewhere, can readily imagine what is the inevitable result of this stratagem to the bouzy monkeys." In Cutter v. Doughty, 7 Hill, 305, the first clause of a will, after giving the testator's wife a life estate in his farm, proceeded thus : "After her death I give to my grandchildren, and to their heirs forever my said farm as follows; to wit: to the children of my step daughter M., lot number I, to the children of my daughter S., lot number 3," and then providing for the children of three other daughters and one son in the same way, concluded by providing that in case of the death of any of his children or of his step daughter, without lawful issue, the share which would have gone to such issue should be equally divided among " the survivors of my children or grandchildren," in the same proportions. It was held that the term "grandchildren embraced the stepdaughter's children, and the judgment of the Supreme Court was reversed, by a vote of 13 to 11. The Chancellor was in the minority (and man ifestly wrong), but he dropped into archi tecture as follows: — "To adopt the figure used by one of the plain tiffs' counsel, therefore, this temple must in any
