where it is said that juries in libel suits always take into view the condition in life of the parties. The point is dis cussed at considerable length, and the Court expressly lays down the proposition that the plaintiff in such actions may give evidence of his own condition in life to aggravate the damages. A similar rule is applied in Connecticut (Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24), in Illinois (Peltier v. Mict, 50 Ill. 511), in.Yirginia (Adams v. Lawson, 17 Gratt. 250, 94 Am. Dec. 455), and Kentucky (Eastland v. Caldwell, 2 Bibt>, 21,4 Am. Dec. 668). See also Shroyer v. Miller, 3 W. Va. 161; Fowler v. Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9. A decision in Indiana, where the question raised was as to the admissi bility of a question calling for the defendant's position in society, seems to indicate that a similar rule would control there touching such testimony when offered on behalf of the plaintiff. The contrary rule prevails in Alabama. Gandy v. Humphries, 35 Ala. 617. The point does not seem to have been presented either to the Supreme Court of the United States or to any of the circuit courts of ap peal." The Court disapprove a dictum to the contrary by Folger, C. J., in Hatfield v. Lasher, 81 N.Y. 246, and cite the following authoritative expression by Kent, C. J., in Foot v. Tracy, 1 Johns, 52: — "In assessing damages the jury must take into considera tion the general character, the standing, and estimation of plaintiff in society; for it will not be pretended that every plaintiff is entitled to an equal sum for the worth of char acter. The jury have, and must inevitably have, a very large and liberal discretion in apportioning damages to the rank, condition, and character of the plaintiff; and they must have evidence touching that condition and character, so as to have some guide to their discretion." Infants' L1fe Insurance Contract — Resc1s s1on. — In Johnson v. Northwestern M. L. Ins. Co., Minnesota Supreme Court, 26 L. R. A. 187, it was held that where an infant, seventeen years old, ob tains a policy of insurance, upon which he pays the premium, and makes several semiannual payments during his minority, but disaffirms the contract im mediately upon his becoming of full age, and offers to surrender the policy to the insurance company, and demands the return of the money so paid, he can, in case of refusal, maintain an action for its re covery. The Court said : — '• But suppose that the contract is free from all elements of fraud, unfairness, or overreaching, and the infant has enjoyed the benefits of it, but has spent or disposed of what he has received, or the benefits received are, as in this case, of such a nature that they cannot be restored. Can he recover back what he has paid? It is well settled in England that he cannot. This was held in the leading case of Holmes -•. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508, approved as late as 1890 in Valentini 1: Canali, L. R. 24 Q. B, Div. 166. Some obiter remarks of the chief justice in Holmes v. Blogg, to the effect that an infant could never recover back money voluntarily paid, were too broad, and have often
been disapproved, — a fact which has sometimes led to the erroneous impression that the case itself has been over ruled. Corpe v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252 (decided by the same court), held that the infant might recover back what he had voluntarily paid, but on the ground that the con tract in that case remained wholly executory on part of the other party, and hence the infant had never enjoyed its benefits. In Chitty on Contracts (vol. I, p. 222), the law is stated in accordance with the decision in Holmes v. Blogg. Leake, a most accurate writer, in his work on Con tracts (page 553), sums up the law to the same effect. In this country, Chancellor Kent (2 Kent Com. 240), and Reeve in his work on Domestic Relations (chapters 2 and 3, title, ' Parent and Child'), state the law in exact accor dance with what we may term the ' English rule.' Par sons, in his work on Contracts (vol. I, p. 322), undoubtedly states the law too broadly, in omitting the qualification, ' and enjoys the benefit of it.' At least a respectable mi nority of the American decisions are in full accord with what we have termed the ' English rule.' See, among others, Riley v. Mallory, 33 Conn. 206; Adams v. Beall, 67 Md. S3; Breed v. Judd, I Gray, 455. But many — perhaps a majority — of the American decisions, apparentlythinking that the English rule does not sufficiently protect the infant, have modified it; and some of them seem to have wholly repudiated it, and to hold that although the contract was in all respects fair and reasonable, and the in fant had enjoyed the benefits of it, yet if the infant had spent or parted with what he had received, or if the bene fits of it were of such a nature that they could not be re stored, still he might recover back what he had paid. The problem with the courts seems to have been, on the one hand, to protect the infant from the improvidence incident to his youth and inexperience, and how, on the other hand, to compel him to conform to the principles of common honesty. The result is that the American authorities — at least the latter ones — have fallen into such a condition of conflict and confusion that it is difficult to draw from them any definite or uniform rule. The dissatisfaction with what we have termed the ' English rule ' seems to be generally based upon the idea that the courts would not grant an infant relief, on the ground of fraud or undue in fluence, except where they would grant it to an adult on the same grounds, and then only on the same conditions. Many of the cases, we admit, would seem to support this idea. If such were the law, it is obvious that there would be many cases where it would furnish no adequate protec tion to the infant." . . . "But if the contract was free from any fraud or bad faith, and otherwise reasonable, except that the price paid by the infant was in excess of the value of what he received, his recovery should be limited to the difference between what he paid and what he received. Such cases as Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 11o; Sparman v. Keim, 83 N. Y. 245; and Heath v. Stevens, 48 N. II. 251, — really proceed upon this principle, although they may not distinctly announce it. The objections to this rule are, in our opinion, largely imaginary, for we are con fident that in practice it can and will be applied by courts and juries so as to work out substantial justice." To this last line of cases may be added Spicer v. Earl, 41 Mich. 191; 32 Am. Rep. 152.
